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The disastrous performance of European financial-market regulation
during the 2008 financial crisis convinced the European powers-that- be
of the urgent need for further integration. Since then the European
Union (EU) has established three European Supervisory Authorities
(ESAs), which are commissioned to enhance capacity and harmonization
of the European banking, insurance, and capital markets law. In
carrying out this task, the ESAs employ so called ESA Guidelines, which
have caught the attention of practitioners and scholars alike. As soft law,
they bear a strong resemblance to instruments used on the global level to
regulate the financial markets and therefore might fall prey to the same
deficiencies. The ostensible resemblance, however, proves misleading.
This Article argues that the deep legal embedding of the ESA Guidelines
provides them with a different regulatory profile that leads to a strong
enforcement effect (Part II.A), the danger of preponderant industry
influence (Part II.B), and the specific characteristics of non-binding rules
(Part III). Under the lens of regulatory subjectivity, these features may
lead to inefficiency and reduced accountability (Part IV). To mitigate this
negative impact, the Article proposes three modest reforms to the legal
structure of the ESAs (Part V).
INTRODUCTION
The 2008 financial crisis caught the European Union off guard. The
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Universitt-Berlin. I am indebted to all participants of the conference "Imagining Post-
Neoliberal Regulatory Subjectivities" for their insightful comments and remarks and to the
editorial staff of the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies.
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol. 23 #2 (Summer 2016)
© Indiana University Maurer School of Law
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 23:2
law of European financial markets was supposed to settle after the
wide-ranging changes that had been implemented in the realization of
the 1999 Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP).' The tumultuous
developments of 2008 invalidated that timetable. What followed the
largest regulatory flood the financial markets had ever encountered was
not a phase of ease, but an even bigger wave of regulation.
All important financial regulations have been either updated or
completely overhauled.2 Along with this reform of the substantive law,
the European Union gave itself a new administrative structure to
enhance its regulatory and coordinating capabilities: the European
System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), which split European
supervision into a macro- and a microeconomic column.3  The
institutions established by the ESFS play an important part in spelling
out the newly reformed substantive framework of the European
financial markets, which is, though already in force, still in large parts a
work in progress. The so-called Lamfalussy process is still hammering
out specific implementation of the established requirements.4 At the
heart of this procedure, the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs),
established by a series of regulations (ESA Regulations),5 work
tirelessly at defining and harmonizing the legal shape of the European
1. Communication of the Commission, Financial Services: Implementing the
Framework for Financial Markets: Action Plan, COM (1999) 232 final (May 11, 1999),
available at http://ec.europa.euinternalmarket/finances/docs/actionplanindexaction_
en.pdf. Following the extensive regulatory activity during the realization of the FSAP, the
Commission sounded the bell for an era of dynamic consolidation. See Commission of the
European Communities, White Paper on Financial Services Policy 2005-2010, COM (2005)
629 final (Dec. 1, 2005), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eulegal-content/EN/TXT/
HTML/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0629&from=EN.
2. For a comparatively short overview of the massive reforms, see generally European
Commission, Economic Review of the Financial Regulation Agenda, COM (2014) 279 final
(May 15, 2014), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/general/
20140515-erfra-working-document en.pdf (detailing reforms that achieve greater financial
stability without sacrificing key public policy objectives of efficiency, market integrity, and
financial integration).
3. The ESFS has been constructed according to the so called De Larosi6re Report,
which was mandated by the European Commission to assess the key weaknesses of the
European regulatory system that had been uncovered by the financial crisis. See The
High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU: Chaired by Jacques de Larosire,
(Feb. 25, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internaLmarket/finances/docs/de_
larosiere.report~en.pdf.
4. For a short overview of the Lamfalussy procedure, see infra Part I.B.2.
5. Council Regulation 1093/ 2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 1 (EU) (establishing European
Banking Authority) [hereinafter EBA Regulation]; Council Regulation 1094/2010, 2010
O.J. (L 331) 48 (EU) (establishing the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions
Authority) [hereinafter EIOPA Regulation]; Council Regulation 1095/2010, O.J. (L 331) 84
(EU) (establishing the European Securities and Markets Authority) [hereinafter ESMA
Regulation]. From now on, I refer to these regulations together as the "ESA Regulations."
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financial markets. The ESAs are three nearly identical sister agencies
that have been tasked with the microeconomic supervision and
regulatory harmonization of the financial markets: the European
Banking Agency (EBA), the European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Authority (EIOPA), and the European Securities Market
Authority (ESMA). Each of them has been assigned a specific sector:
banking, insurance, and securities, respectively. Their organizational
structure has been constructed out of the most integrated parts that are
currently available in the diverse landscape of European agencies. Even
though they are considered network agencies,6 all three have extensive
administrative substructures that are supposed to grow steadily in the
next years. This is supposed to enable the ESAs to monitor and
facilitate the coherence of financial regulation, whereas the routine of
daily supervision is mostly left to the national supervisors.
7
The European agencies are equipped with a truly impressive
supervisory and regulatory toolkit. When designing it, the European
legislature did not only think of traditional legal means; it also
upgraded and expanded traditional soft-law instruments. The result has
caught the attention of practitioners and scholars alike.
Soft guidance in the form of the ESA Guidelines has been
implemented as one of the central tools in the regulation of the
European financial markets. Three and a half years after their
establishment, the ESAs had already published forty-three guidelines.
8
According to the ESAs annual work programs, over sixty specific
guidelines were published from 2014 through early 2015 alone: seven by
the EBA, thirty-six by the EIOPA, and twenty-one by the ESMA. It
therefore seems as though soft guidance will be an essential part of the
future of European financial regulation.
Soft law9 is hardly new in the sphere of financial regulation.
6. EBA Regulation, supra note 5, at 17 (Recital 39); ESMA Regulation, supra note 5,
at 89 (Recital 39). "Network agencies" are administrative structures of the European
Union that are governed by a network of Member State authorities, i.e. the 28 heads of the
respective national authorities. Most of them do not possess extensive administrative
substructures but are mere coordinative entities. Network agencies are tasked with
legislative coordination. For an instructive introduction, see David Coen & Mark
Thatcher, Network Governance and Multi-level Delegation: European Networks of
Regulatory Agencies, 28 J. PUB. POL'Y 48 (2008).
7. An important exception is the supervision of credit rating agencies, assigned to the
ESMA. See Council Regulation No. 1060/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 302) 1 (EC).
8. Commission Staff Working Document, at 28, COM (2014) 509 final (Aug. 8, 2014),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/finances/docs/committees/140808-esfs-
swd en.pdf.
9. I will not dwell on the question of whether soft law can be called "law" or what
actually constitutes soft law. Instead I will use the term simply to describe agreements
that neither purport to have nor actually have directly legally binding effects. For further
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Especially on the global level, soft governance is the most dominant
means of coordinating financial markets. The implications and
deficiencies of such nonbinding harmonization, and especially its most
prominent example, the Basel Committee's publications, have been
widely discussed. It often has been noted that they entail compliance
and legitimacy problems.10 With that in mind it seems reasonable to
expect that the ESA Guidelines might suffer from the same defects.
Indeed, the structure and mechanisms of the Basel Committee and the
ESAs seem surprisingly similar at first glance.1 However, the deep
legal and political embedding of the ESAs in the European Union, as
well as the procedural provisions of the Guidelines, severely reduce the
likelihood of noncompliance by the Member States. 12 By contrast, a hard
look shows that legitimacy problems seem to exist also on the European
level. The soft-law nature of the Guidelines leads to reduced
accountability when compared to legislation. This might enable special
interests to influence their drafting.13
Against this background the question arises of why the European
legislature decided to draft the ESA Guidelines as soft guidance.
Though European law generally restricts the legislative powers that can
be assigned to an agency, there are procedural circumvention
techniques that already enable the ESA to act as a de facto legislator.
However, flexibility, swiftness, and a special regulatory effect caused by
the combination of soft law and the underlying hard law tilted the
balance toward an additional soft-law instrument. 14
From a subjectivity perspective, certain normative conclusions can
be drawn. Subjectivity as substantive programming of legal entities
implies a more intrusive approach to regulation. It aims at creating a
certain organizational fabric of the regulatory target by defining its
inner structure. It thereby seeks to predetermine acts of the regulated
introduction to the discussion, see Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft
Law: Alternatives, Complements and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN.
L. REV. 706, 712-17 (2010). For an overview of the wide range of soft law existing in the
European Union and its possible classification, see Fabien Terpan, Soft Law in the
European Union-The Changing Nature of EU Law, 21 EUR. L.J. 68 (2015).
10. See infra I.A.
11. One of the most significant shared characteristics of the two is that the heads of
the national financial regulators are the key players in both institutions. Therefore, from a
political science perspective, they both qualify as transgovernmental networks (TRN). See
generally Burkard Eberlein & Abraham L. Newman, Escaping the International
Governance Dilemma? Incorporated Transgovernmental Networks in the European Union,
21 GOVERNANCE: INT'L J. POL'Y, ADM. & INST. 25 (2008) (discussing transgovernmental
networks and European Union policymaking).
12. See infra I.B.
13. See infra I.C.
14. See infra II.A.
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entity, rendering traditional instruments of regulation redundant. If
ESA Guidelines are used as an instrument to shape subjectivities, their
"hardened" soft-law nature reinforces calls for an administrative law
that acknowledges and reflects their wide-ranging effects. 15
I. ESA GUIDELINES AS SOFT LAW
According to Article 16 of the ESA Regulations, ESA Guidelines
should work toward "establishing consistent, efficient and effective
supervisory practices within the ESFS, and . .. ensuring the common,
uniform and consistent application of Union law." They can be
addressed to Member State supervisory authorities and financial
institutions, but until now almost all of the Guidelines have been
addressed to the supervisory authorities to establish a common
understanding of European law. The ESAs can issue guidelines with
respect to all relevant matters within their scope of action. Even though
some European acts expressly require the ESAs to issue guidelines for
further elaboration of a certain requirement, the authorities are not
limited to these explicit authorizations. On the contrary, the ESAs are
entitled to publish guidelines on their own initiative and on almost
every topic that seems relevant. The ESA Regulations, however, do not
provide for legally binding guidelines.16 This means they do not create
any legal rights or duties.17 Since Article 263 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states that the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) only reviews acts "intended to
produce legal effects," ESA Guidelines cannot be subject to judicial
review by the European courts.
15. See infra III.
16. Some confusion resulted from the wording of the ESA Regulations. They do not
expressly state that ESA-Guidelines are mere soft-law instruments. A corresponding
reference had been removed in the legislative process by the European Parliament. This
has led to a certain sense of "ambiguity" among scholars when it comes to the legal nature
of the ESA-Guidelines. See Rob van Gestel & Thomas van Golen, Enforcement by the New
European Supervisory Agencies: Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?, in VARIETIES OF
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC LAW AND REGULATION: LIBER AMICORUM FOR HANS MICKLITZ 757,
766-67 (Kai Purnhagen & Peter Rott eds., 2014). However, even without considering the
restrictive European law of agency powers, see infra II.A, the structure and procedure of
the Guidelines as laid down in the ESA Regulations clearly suggest that they are legally
nonbinding tools. This is also the most common interpretation among European legal
scholars. See Madalina Busuioc, Rule-Making by the European Financial Supervisory
Authorities: Walking a Tight Rope, 19 EUR. L.J. 111, 118 (2013); Marloes van Rijsbergen,
On the Enforceability of EU Agencies' Soft Law at the National Level: The Case of the
European Securities and Markets Authority, UTRECHT L. REV., Dec. 2014, at 116.
17. At least no direct legal effects. For a discussion of the possible indirect legal effects,
see infra note 194.
459
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Soft governance is an old phenomenon that has been discussed
extensively. One of the oldest traditions of using soft law as a means of
coordination can be found in international law. Therefore, a first
reference point for assessing the functional design of the ESA
Guidelines can be gained by taking into account the literature
discussing international soft law of the global financial markets. The
most prominent examples in this regard are the publications on bank
capital and liquidity of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
Like the ESAs, the Basel Committee is run by the heads of national
supervisory authorities. It therefore seems probable that the key
deficiencies of global financial-market soft law might also apply to ESA
Guidelines (Section A), namely noncompliance (Section B) and
preponderant industry influence (Section C).
A. Global Soft Law: The Basel Committee
The literature on international soft law is extensive and
correspondingly rich.'8 In international law, "soft agreements" are often
used as a "stepping stone" to reach consensus in areas in which a "hard"
treaty arrangement cannot be achieved.19 A nonbinding agreement does
18. See generally, e.g., Alan Boyle, Soft Law in International Law-Making, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW 122 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 3d ed. 2010) (discussing the contribution
soft law makes to the general structure of international law); CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAw
AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2012)
(explaining how international financial law and its informal, nonbinding agreements
work); COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (Dina Shelton, ed. 2000) (discussing the interrelation of
the nature of international law, the role of legally nonbinding norms, and compliance with
international norms); Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171 (2010) (explaining why nation-states use soft law that describes a
much broader range of behavior); Hartmut Hillgenberg, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 ER.
J. INT'L. L. 499 (1999) (discussing how nontreaty agreements play an important role in
international relations); Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law:
Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 706 (2010) (arguing that hard and soft law sometimes interact in a complementary
and mutually reinforcing, evolutionary fashion, but only under certain conditions). For an
organizational perspective, see, for example, Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard
and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT'L. ORG. 421 (2000) (analyzing the
spectrum of international legalization from soft informal agreements to hard legal
arrangements). For an earlier assessment, see C. M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law:
Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT'L & CoMP. L. Q. 850 (1989)
(examining the conflicting claims and challenges soft law presents to the international
legal order).
19. Hillgenberg, supra note 18, at 502; see also Boyle, supra note 18, at 125; Kal
Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks
and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 86 (2002).
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not only allow for a flexible and fast solution
2° but also for more detailed
and precise provisions when compared to a treaty, because it can be met
by a low level of compliance.21 Negotiation and exit costs are therefore
comparatively lower than in treaty formation.
22 This characteristic of a
provisional commitment has, however, also been identified as one of
international soft law's key weaknesses: nations are able to and engage
in "cherry-picking" of soft law provisions or abandon prior commitments
entirely,23 even though heavy political pressure on the global level can
lead to high compliance rates.
When it comes to the international regulation of financial markets,
sheer political power is not always necessary. There are additional
supporting mechanisms at work that further compliance: expertise and
market pressure.24 These are the main driving forces behind the overall
high compliance with private standards, which are especially dominant
in international financial law. Private standards have a substrate of
expert knowledge.25 They draw legitimacy and compliance from this
expertise. Furthermore, the need for uniform rules often leads to
indirect enforcement by third parties.2
6 Some of the private standards
are even "upgraded" to public rules by lawmakers.
27 Even though such
an "upgrade" might be the most blatant case, private standards in
general create an friction with legitimacy considerations.
28 Put briefly,
20. See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment,
12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 420, 421-422 (1991).
21. Boyle, supra note 18, at 125.
22. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 18, at 434; Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates
International Finance-And Not Trade, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 623, 631 (2010).
23. Brummer, supra note 22, at 636.
24. See BRUMMER, supra note 18, at 140-56.
25. William W. Bratton, Private Standards, Public Governance: A New Look at the
Financial Standards Accounting Board, 48 B. C. L. REV. 5 (2007); Dieter Kerwer, Rules
that Many Use: Standards and Global Regulation, 18 GOVERNANCE: INT. J. POLY ADM. &
INST. 611 (2005). For a principal-agent perspective, see Walter Mattli & Tim Bilthe,
Global Private Governance: Lessons from a National Model of Setting Standards in
Accounting, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225, 229 et seq. (2005).
26. Kerwer, supra note 25, at 624 (citing credit rating agencies as an example of such
private actors in regard to the Basel Committee capital requirements).
27. See generally Eve Chiapello & Karim Medjad, An Unprecedented Privatisation of
Mandatory Standard-Setting: The Case of European Accounting Policy, 20 CRITICAL
PERSP. AccT. 448 (2009) (discussing EU accounting regulations); Geoffrey Underhill &
Xiaoke Zhang, Setting the Rules: Private Power, Political Underpinnings, and Legitimacy
in Global Monetary and Financial Governance, 84 INT'L AFF. 535 (2008) (discussing the
even more prominent case of the Basel Committee).
28. See Chiapello & Medjad, supra note 27 (criticizing the legitimacy of private
standards); Alan J. Richardson & Burkhard Eberlein, Legitimating Transnational
Standard-Setting: The Case of the International Accounting Standards Board, 98 J. BUS.
ETHICS 217 (2011) (discussing the same topic, but less critically).
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"Standard setters are accused of being secretive, industry dominated,
and unrepresentative of all interested parties."29
Most of the above holds true in regard to the Basel Committee. The
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is a forum for regular
cooperation on banking supervisory matters, which is institutionally
assigned to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The
Committee has twenty-eight member nations that are represented by
their central banks and financial supervisors. Lacking a legal mandate,
all of its publications are mere soft law.30 In contrast to a European
directive or an international treaty, states that commit to the Basel
Committee's standards have no legal obligation to transpose them into
national law. They still might yield to different considerations, as the
example of the long-delayed implementation of Basel II by the United
States richly illustrates.31 Even though the last financial crisis led to a
political environment that favors strict and internationally coordinated
financial regulation,32 incentives for noncompliance remain especially
powerful in financial markets regulation.33 To counter these, the
Financial Stability Board (FSB) has put in place peer-review
mechanisms that are supposed to increase political pressure.34
Furthermore, concerns about the Basel Committee's legitimacy have
been voiced. The Committee has been described as secretive in its
29. Bratton, supra note 25, at 6.
30. Kern Alexander, Global Financial Standard Setting, the G10 Committees, and
International Economic Law, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 861, 874 (2008-2009); Duncan E.
Alford, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision: An Enforceable International
Financial Standard?, 28 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 237, 269, 284 et seq. (2005); Michael
S. Barr, Who's in Charge of Global Finance?, 45 GEO. J. INT'L L. 971, 981 et seq. (2014);
Arie C. Eernisse, Banking on Cooperation: The Role of the G-20 in Improving the
International Financial Architecture, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 239, 253 et seq. (2012);
Andrew D. Mitchell & John Farnik, Global Administrative Law: Can It Bring Global
Governance to Account?, 37 FEDERAL L. REV. 237 (2009).
31. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, US Implementation of Basel II. Lessons for Informal
International Lawmaking, in INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 437 (Joost
Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel, & Jan Wouters eds., 2012) (offering a detailed account of
the developments and involved interests).
32. Barr, supra note 30, at 995 et seq.
33. See Brummer, supra note 22, at 635; see also Alford, supra note 30, at 286. But see
Narissa Lyngen, Basel III: Dynamics of State Implementation, 53 HARV. INT'L L.J. 519,
531 (2012) (arguing that almost all developed countries implemented Basel III).
34. Barr, supra note 30, at 1003-05; see generally Edward F. Greene & Joshua L.
Boehm, The Limits of "Name-and-Shame" in International Financial Regulation, 97
CORNELL L. REV. 1083 (2012) (discussing the limits of such a reputation-based
enforcement system on the global level).
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deliberations35 and industry-friendly in its regulatory approach.36 In
response to such criticism, the Basel Committee has resorted to a public
notice-and-comment procedure.37 Still, legitimacy concerns persist.
When considered against this background, it seems reasonable to
expect that the ESA Guidelines as soft law might also fall prey to these
two main deficiencies: on the one hand, they might suffer from
underenforcement or noncompliance, since certain regulatory projects
might have been downgraded to the ESA-level to reduce compliance
costs. On the other hand, the involvement of stakeholders and private
interest groups might raise legitimacy issues that could undermine the
neutral expert standing of the ESAs.
B. The Danger of Noncompliance
The ESA Guidelines are legally nonbinding. However, the lack of
legal effect does not equal irrelevance. As the ESA Regulations state,
"The competent authorities and financial institutions shall make every
effort to comply with those Guidelines and recommendations."38 Though
this statement might give rise to a political duty without legal
repercussions, it is in fact observed: only a few instances of
noncompliance have been reported by Member State authorities.39 The
"factual relevance" that has been assigned to the Guidelines by scholars
does exist. Its roots can be traced to the ESA Regulations (Subsection 1),
and its reach extends to market participants (Subsection 2). In the
multilayered governance system of the EU, the ESA Guidelines
naturally affect two levels. On the European supervisory level, it
determines the practices of the national supervisory authorities, which,
on the national level, impose the Guidelines on financial institutions
that have no recourse but to comply or sue.
35. David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration,
5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 547, 569-72; see also BRUMMER, supra note 31, at 61; Mitchel & Farnik,
supra note 30, at 244.
36. See Alexander, supra note 30, at 879-80.
37. See Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View
from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 15, 16 (2006); see also Lyngen, supra note 33, at 532
(criticizing the legitimacy since the actual negotiations among the Committee members
are still held in secret).
38. EBA Regulation, supra note 5, at art. 16, 3.
39. Instances of noncompliance have, for example, arisen in the context of Solvency II,
see infra note 110 and 147. France was not prepared to apply certain requirements
beforehand. Even in this regard, however, there were only 15 noncompliance notes,
compared to 790 compliance reports. See Guidelines on Complaints-Handling by Insurance
Undertakings, EUR. INS. & OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS AUTHORITY (Mar. 21, 2013),
https://eiopa.europa.eu/publications/eiopa-guidelines/guidelines-on-complaints-handling-
by-insurance-undertakings.
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1. National Supervisors: "Comply or Explain" and "Name and
Shame"
On the European level ESA Guidelines in most cases address
Member State authorities. To ensure Member State compliance, the
ESA Regulations establish certain soft enforcement tools that until now
have worked efficiently.
The high compliance level is mainly fostered by the determined
political commitment of the relevant actors to the goal of a harmonized
financial-markets law. This constitutes a significant departure from the
political status quo before 2008. The predecessors of the ESAs40 also
published guidelines and were supposed to establish a harmonizing
coordination between the Member State authorities. However, it was
clearly recognizable to the European Commission that, "[a]t times, the
Level 3 Committees do not seem to be fully equipped to deliver what has
been expected of them [and that a] stronger political impetus [was]
needed."4 1 The financial crisis gave rise to such a political impetus: one
of the main aims in establishing the ESFS was the "[gireater
harmonisation and the coherent application of rules for financial
institutions and markets across the Union. ' 42 The financial turmoil of
2008 led to a general political consensus that a single rulebook for the
European financial markets had to be established. That consensus is
still shared among supervisors and politicians. In this regard, both the
ESA framework and the Basel Committee profit from the strong
political agenda fueled by the financial crisis that has set a fast pace for
regulatory reform for the last few years.43
That strong political impetus is also reflected by the ESA
Regulations. They establish that "[t]he competent authorities and
financial market participants shall make every effort to comply with
[the] guidelines and recommendations."44 This provision has caused
quite a headache among scholars.45 Whereas the noncompliance option
for national authorities clearly shows that the provision cannot embody
40. Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), Committee of European
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS) and Committee of European
Securities Regulators (CESR).
41. Communication of the Commission, Review of the Lamfalussy Process:
Strengthening Supervisory Convergence, COM (2007), 727 final (Nov. 20, 2007), available
at http://eur-lex.europa.eulegal-content/EN/TXT/HTMLI?uri=CELEX:52007DCO727&from
=EN.
42. EBA Regulation, supra note 5, at 13 (Recital 9).
43. For the strong political pressure on the Basel Committee from the G20 countries,
see Eernisse, supra note 30, at 253.
44. ESMA Regulation, supra note 5, at art. 16, 1 3.
45. See van Gestel & van Golen, supra note 16, at 766-67.
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a legal obligation, its wording suggests at least some kind of legal
relevance.46 However, the comply-or-explain mechanism is the only
instrument of enforcement, which renders the wording a political
postulation.
It therefore comes as no surprise that "comply or explain" dominates
the literature on the ESA Guidelines. The procedure has a
straightforward design. Once approved by the ESAs' governing body,
the Board of Supervisors, guidelines are published on the websites of
the ESAs.47 Within the next two months, each Member State has to
declare itself either compliant or noncompliant, meaning that it intends
or does not intend to apply the Guidelines when supervising market
participants.4 8 If a Member State does not intend to comply, it has to
explain its noncompliance to the European authority. The
noncompliance is published by the ESAs.49 If it deems it necessary, each
ESA can additionally publish the explanation given by the Member
State for its noncompliance.5 0 The ESA is able to "name and shame" the
deviator. Furthermore, the ESAs are supposed to monitor the
implementation of the Guidelines by peer review.5 1
A substantial "hardening" of the Guidelines' soft law has been
attributed to this procedure.5 2  The mandatory publication of
noncompliance in particular is described as one of the core features that
will significantly increase Guideline application. This practice of
"naming and shaming" is said to reduce noncompliance to a minimum
46. See id.
47. In accordance with article 73 paragraph 1 of the ESA Regulations, all guidelines
are translated into all official EU languages. EBA Regulation, supra note 5, at 45; EIOPA
Regulation, supra note 5, at 81; ESMA Regulation, supra note 5, at 117.
48. EBA Regulation, supra note 5, at art. 16, 3.
49. Financial institutions do not have to report their compliance status unless the
Guidelines require it. In this case, no explanation is required and the noncompliance of
the market participant is not published. However, its compliance is ensured by the
interpretation and enforcement powers of the supervisory authorities. See infra I.B.2.
50. Even though the wording of the ESA Regulation does not explicitly provide for
them, cases in which a guideline is not applied by a Member State despite a previously
submitted notice of compliance should also be published in order to give full effect to the
reputational enforcement mechanism.
51. EBA Regulation, supra note 5, at art. 30, 2(b); EIOPA Regulation, supra note 5, at
art. 30, 2(b); ESMA Regulation, supra note 5, at art. 30 2(b).
52. See Niamh Moloney, The European Securities and Markets Authority and
Institutional Design for the EU Financial Market - A Tale of Two Competences: Part 1:
Rule-Making, 12 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. 41, 65-66 (2011); see also Eddy Wymeersch, The
European Financial Supervisory Authorities or ESAs, in FINANCIAL REGULATION AND
SUPERVISION: A POST-CRISIS ANALYSIS 232, 1 9.166 (Eddy Wymeersch, et al. eds., 2012);
Luca Martino Levi, The European Banking Authority: Legal Framework, Operations and
Challenges Ahead, 28 TULANE EUR. & CIVIL L.F. 51, 71 (2013); Busuioc, supra note 16, at
118-19; van Gestel & van Golen, supra note 16, at 766-67.
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by threatening the reputation of a Member State.53 Indeed, Member
State supervisors will now have to engage in an examination of the ESA
Guidelines. Furthermore, the explanation requirement leads to a
certain degree of reasoned decision-making, as insufficient explanations
run the risk of being published along with the noncompliance notice and
might turn into an embarrassment or an undesired market signal that
undermines a supervisor's reputation.
Whether this really cures the European soft law of potential
compliance issues is unclear. After all, reputational mechanisms also
exist on the global level. The FSB has put in place peer-review
mechanisms as well.54 Still, there are substantial differences between
the procedures that are likely to result in different compliance rates.
Those differences are rooted in the completely divergent regulatory
settings. Whereas the ESAs operate in a common legislative framework
that is aimed at ensuring consistent and coherent legal requirements,
the FSB has to deal with diverse jurisdictions, which are not governed
by mutual financial regulations. At the European level, Member States
have already relinquished their respective sovereign powers to the
European Union by the time the ESAs come into play. By contrast,
nation-states are still vigilantly guarding their sovereignty at the global
level. Furthermore, the FSB cannot rely on a mechanism comparable to
the ESA-Guideline procedure, which is specifically aimed at comphance
with one particular soft-law instrument. The Guideline procedure
enables the ESAs to exert reputational pressure in a targeted and
constructive manner. Noncompliance will be made public, making it
easy to understand and designate deviation. Again by contrast, the FSB
mostly conducts country and thematic peer reviews55 that are not
structured as clearly as ESA compliance reports. They therefore run the
risk of burying important details in technocratic reports that are not as
easy to access as the color-coded compliance tables of the ESAs. This is
likely to reduce the overall reputational pressure. Another problem that
has been identified in the FSB peer-review system is that it lacks
sufficient funding.5 6 However, the most striking difference between the
53. See Busuioc, supra note 16, at 118-19; see also van Gestel & van Golen, supra note
16, at 766; Wymeersch, supra note 52, 9.167.
54. See supra text accompanying note 34.
55. Of the 20 peer reviews conducted by the FSB, so far 12 have been country reports
and 8 thematic peer reviews. Peer Review Reports, FIN. STABILITY BOARD (2016),
http://www.fsb.org/publications/peer-review.reports/?mt-page=l.
56. See Eric Helleiner, What Role for the New Financial Stability Board? The Politics of
International Standards After the Crisis, 1 GLOBAL POL'Y 282, 286 (2010); see also Eric
Helleiner, Debate: Did the Financial Crisis Generate a Fourth Pillar of Global Economic
Architecture?, 19 SWISS POL. ScI. REV. 558, 559 (2013); Jonas Pontusson, Global and
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two systems is the consensus requirement of the FSB.57 As all peer-
review reports need to be approved before publication by the FSB
Plenary, the FSB's decision-making body, a country under review that
fears reputational damage is in a position to block the release.
58 The
publication of a noncompliance notice, however, is mandatory under the
ESA Regulations. The FSB peer-review mechanisms, therefore, rather
aim at peer pressure among the club of regulators, whereas the ESA
procedure can also draw support from the disciplining effects of public
shaming and market reputation.
Another reason for the high compliance rate of the ESA Guidelines
is the coordinating function of the Board of Supervisors. It is the
agencies' most important governance institution, which makes all
important decisions.59 The Board consists of the heads of all twenty-
eight supervisory agencies of the EU Member States and constitutes the
core network element of the agencies.60 Therefore, even though the
ESAs are European agencies by their nature, the role that is assigned to
the Member State actors is significant.61 Supported by the permanent
staff of the ESAs, the Board of Supervisors issues "implementing
technical standards" and "regulatory technical standards";62 makes
binding decisions if EU law is breached, an emergency situation occurs,
Domestic Politics in the Wake of the Financial and Economic Crisis, 19 SWISS POL. SCI.
REV. 546, 547 (2013).
57. See Financial Stability Board Charter art. 9, para. 2, available at http://www.fsb.
org/wp-content/uploads/FSB-Charter-with-revised-Annex-FINAL.pdf.
58. See Rolf H. Weber & Dominic N. Staiger, Financial Stability Board: Mandate and
Implementation of Its Systemic Risks Standards, 2 INT'L J. FIN. STUD. 82, 94 (2014); see
also HANDBOOK FOR FSB PEER REVIEWS 12 (2014), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_140106.pdf (stating that
"[c]onsensus is not synonymous with unanimity" and outlining a possible compromise that
would include differing opinions on the review in the final publication). Though this would
be the most intelligible solution, it does not seem to find support in the wording of the FSB
charter.
59. These important decisions include appointing the chairperson and the executive
director. EBA Regulation, supra note 5, at art. 48 2, art. 51 2; EIOPA Regulation,
supra note 5, at art. 48 2, art. 51 2; ESMA Regulation, supra note 5, at art. 48 2, art.
5112.
60. For a political perspective, see generally Eberlein & Newman, supra note 11, at 31-
44 (comparing the European network agencies to the international transgovernmental
networks).
61. For the same analysis, see Paul Craig, Comitology, Rulemaking and the Lisbon
Settlement: Tensions and Strains, in RULEMAKING BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION: THE
NEW SYSTEM FOR DELEGATION OF POWERS 173, 194 et seq. (Carl Fredrik Bergstrom &
Dominique Ritleng eds., 2016).
62. EBA Regulation, supra note 5, at arts. 10-15; EIOPA Regulation, supra note 5, at
arts. 10-15; ESMA Regulation, supra note 5, at arts. 10-15.
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or a disagreement among Member States arises;63 and approves new
guidelines.64 Almost all of these decisions are made by a qualified
majority of the board.65 As the members of the board are the heads of
the national supervisory authorities, they know exactly what is
politically feasible in their respective Member States. In most cases, it is
they who decide whether a Member State will comply with the
Guidelines or not. Furthermore, it is likely that the culture of the
European Council, which places great value on consensus, will dominate
among the chief supervisors. Especially against a political background
that continuously stresses the need for a coherent EU law, the pressure
to reach a compromise is very high. Therefore, even though a qualified
majority is sufficient to adopt a guideline, most decisions will be taken
on a consensus basis. The peer pressure among the supervisors is likely
to serve as another factor inducing compliance.66 Board members might
fear for their credibility and therefore not deviate from Guidelines once
they have been agreed to. 67
Commentators have attributed a certain coordinating function to
the Basel Committee as well. 68 However, due to the heavy regulatory
impact of most issues the Basel Committee deals with, implementation
is not at the discretion of the respective member representatives. In
most instances, the required changes to the national financial markets
law require legislative execution and cannot be adopted by central
banks or supervisory authorities on their own.69 By contrast, ESA
Guidelines are supposed to only specify already implemented European
legal acts. This results in a low level of accountability. Guidelines are
issued by the ESAs without a mandate or any control mechanism of the
63. EBA Regulation, supra note 5, at arts. 17-19; EIOPA Regulation, supra note 5, at
arts. 17-19; ESMA Regulation, supra note 5, at arts. 17-19.
64. EBA Regulation, supra note 5, at art. 16; EIOPA Regulation, supra note 5, at art.
16; ESMA Regulation, supra note 5, at art. 16.
65. See EBA Regulation, supra note 5, at art. 44; EIOPA Regulation, supra note 5, at
art. 44; ESMA Regulation, supra note 5, at art. 44, which cross reference art. 16
paragraph 4 TEU.
66. Wymeersch, supra note 52, 9.167.
67. See Moloney, supra note 52, at 65-66 (mentioning the ESA competencies to issue
binding decisions in this regard); see also EBA Regulation, supra note 5, at arts. 17-19;
EIOPA Regulation, supra note 5, at arts. 17-19; ESMA Regulation, supra note 5, at arts.
17-19. However, whether these can be used to enforce Guidelines that Member States
have not complied with seems disputable. In this case, the binding decision powers of the
ESA would make the possibility of noncompliance irrelevant and indirectly give legal
effect to the Guidelines. The singular nature of the ESA competencies postcrisis might
justify this; mediation and breach of Union law rather not.
68. See Barr, supra note 30, at 982 n.51.
69. See generally Pierre-Hugues Verdier, supra note 31 (discussing the Basel II
implementation process in the United States).
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European Parliament or Council. Just as the Basel Committee, the
ESAs lack the power to make law. However, since ESA Guidelines do
not require transposition into national law, but are integrated into the
respective jurisdictions through the supervisor's discretion, they lack
subsequent legislative approval. Thus, the coordinating function of the
ESAs has a greater effect than the one attributable to the Basel
Committee.
2. Financial Institutions: Big Stick or Day-to-Day Supervision?
Institutions face different factors that make the Guidelines "quasi-
binding"70 for them. Some scholars suggest that peer pressure among
financial institutions contributes significantly to the "factual" binding
effect, since institutions will fear the "big stick" of a binding legal act
and will therefore comply with nonbinding Guidelines to retain at least
some room to maneuver.71 This take on the problem sounds convincing
at first but is put under pressure by the collective-action problem.
7 2
Taking into account the hundreds of financial institutions in more than
two dozen jurisdictions that are subject to ESA Guidelines, it is more
likely that institutions will engage in opportunistic behavior and free-
riding than complying as a group to avoid hard-law regulation.
73
A more convincing explanation can be given by looking at the
interwovenness of the Guidelines with hard law.74 In contrast to the
supervisory authorities, financial institutions face hard enforcement of
the soft-law requirements: the enforcement power of the European
supervisory authorities can translate nonbinding standards into actual
hard law. If considered in isolation from other factors such as judicial
70. See Moloney, supra note 52, at 65.
71. van Gestel & van Golen, supra note 16, at 766.
72. See generally Michael Taylor, Cooperation and Rationality: Notes on the Collective
Action Problem and Its Solution, in THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY 222 (Karen Schweers
Cook & Margaret Levi eds., 1990) (explaining collective action); Katharina Holzinger, The
Problems of Collective Action: A New Approach (Max-Planck Institute for Research on
Collective Goods, Working Paper No. 2003/2), available at http://www.econstor.eu/
bitstream/10419/85085/1/2003-02_online.pdf.
73. A high number of players involved increases the risk of free-riding significantly.
See Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self Regulation: An Institutional
Perspective, 19 L. & POLY 363, 393 (1997).
74. Terpan, supra note 9, at 84-85 (noting the difficulty of differentiating soft law from
hard law, as soft law is undergoing a specific hardening that is "ambiguous" to its actual
soft legal nature). However, Terpan's analysis deals with the enforcement regime of the
European Commission in relation to the Member States. By contrast, the ESA-Guidelines
are only subject to soft enforcement on the European level, whereas, when applied by the
Member States on the national level, they are fed into the hard enforcement of the
supervisory authorities.
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review, it does not matter how the decision of a supervisory authority is
substantively programmed. No matter whether laid down in a European
regulation, a Member State transposition act, or a nonbinding
interpretative guideline, the substance of an administrative decision is
legally binding. Therefore, market participants are generally well
advised to comply.
The interrelations at work are best understood against the
background of the specific structure that governs EU financial
regulation: the Lamfalussy procedure.75 The Lamfalussy procedure
constitutes the four-level regulatory process of the European financial
markets, in which regulation is supposed to gain more and more detail
with each level it passes through.76 The division of labor among the
different actors is supposed to make regulation faster and more
efficient, thereby leading to an optimal allocation of legitimacy and
expertise. The underlying rationale of this regulatory system is that
important decisions with broad implications are made at the first level,
while the details are left to lower levels. At the first level, so-called
"framework directives" of the European legislature (i.e., the European
Parliament and Council) are supposed to lay down the fundamentals of
the legislation.77 These are further defined by the Commission via
delegated and implementing acts at the second level. This second level
needs to be activated through a mandate of the European legislature,
which controls how finely grained the regulation is designed. At the
third level, the ESAs come into play. They are in charge of further
refining the second-level interpretations and coordinating the
application of European law among the national supervisory
authorities. A central tool at this stage is the ESA-Guideline. Finally, at
the fourth level, it is the responsibility of both the ESAs and the
Commission to monitor the application of the law and ensure
coherence.78
75. The procedure is named after the head rapporteur of a "Committee of Wise Men"
report that first suggested the procedural changes to the European regulation in the
financial markets. In the wake of the FSAP, the Commission had also called for a faster
and more efficient procedure to draft, issue, and implement the extensive legislative
changes that were supposed to give the European financial markets a more integrated
legal form. The procedure designed for the FSAP proved to be so successful that its
application was extended from capital markets regulation to banking and insurance
regulation as well. For a more detailed overview, see Duncan E. Alford, The Lam falussy
Process and EU Bank Regulation: Another Step on the Road to Pan-European Regulation?,
25 ANNUAL REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 389, 397 et seq. (2006).
76. Id. at 399.
77. Id.
78. It is at this fourth stage that the ESAs are supposed to use peer review to monitor
the application of ESA-Guidelines. See supra text accompanying note 51.
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The "Guidelines on certain aspects of the MiFID compliance
function requirements"79 offer a quite descriptive example of the
"hardening" effect of the Lamfalussy procedure on ESA Guidelines, and
also gives insight into the multilevel governance system of the European
Union. In 2004 the European legislature issued the Markets in
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID 1),8
0 a first-level framework
directive, which by its legal nature was not directly legally binding on
the Member State jurisdictions but had to be transposed into national
law.81 MiFID 1 stated that Member States should require investment
firms to establish adequate policies and procedures sufficient to ensure
compliance of the firm.8 2 To further elaborate this requirement, the
European legislature also provided a legislative mandate for the
Commission to adopt second-level implementing measures. Relying on
this mandate the Commission issued an implementing directive, which
stated that Member States, to fulfil their obligations under MiFID 1,
should require investment firms to establish and maintain a permanent
and effective compliance function which should operate independently
and should carry out certain tasks, such as monitoring and assessing
the adequacy and effectiveness of the measures and procedures put in
place to ensure compliance.83 The first- and second-level directives and
their respective requirements were transposed into binding national
law. The United Kingdom, for example, updated its policies to include
the legal requirements of the European law, with wording nearly
identical to that of the European acts.84 In 2008 the Commission noted
that the legal transposition of the MiFID and its implementing
79. EuR. SEC. & MKTS. AUTH. (ESMA), GUIDELINES ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE MIFID
COMPLIANCE FUNCTION REQUIREMENTS, ESMA/2012/388 (Sept. 28, 2012) [hereinafter
ESMA-MIFID].
80. Council Directive 2004/39, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1 (EC). The European legislature
already published an updated version of this directive, MiFID 2, which will take effect in
January 2017. See Council Directive 2014/65, art. 93, para. 1, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 349 (EU).
This directive will be complemented by a directly applicable regulation that will recast
some of the provisions of the MiFID 1. Together both measures will replace the old MiFID,
which will have been in force for over a decade. See Commission Regulation 600/2014,
2014 O.J. (L 173) 84 (EU).
81. Article 288, paragraph 3 of the TFEU states, "A directive shall be binding, as to the
result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to
the national authorities the choice of form and methods." Consolidated Version of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 288, para. 3, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012
O.J. (C 326) 172.
82. Article 13 para 2 Council Directive 2004/39, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1 (EC).
83. Article 6 Commission Directive 2006/73, 2006 O.J. (L 241) 26 (EC).
84. See HER MAJESTY'S TREASURY, EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM TO THE FINANCIAL
SERVICES AND MARKETS ACT, 2007, at 14 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.
uk/uksi2006/3384/pdfs/uksiem_20063384_en.pdf.
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measures was successfully completed by the United Kingdom.85
However, this was not the final word on European compliance
requirements. In 2012 the newly founded ESMA, one of the three ESAs,
deemed it necessary to use its powers under Article 16 of the ESA
Regulations in order to further ensure the common, uniform, and
consistent application of MiFID 1. After ESMA had held an open and
public consultation and requested a statement of stakeholder groups, it
published the "Guidelines on certain aspects of the MiFID compliance
function requirements." These guidelines laid down precise and specific
instructions on how the European directives with regard to the
compliance function should be interpreted, covering areas such as group
companies, methodologies, information relevance, and complaints.8 6 The
guidelines became effective sixty days after their publication, triggering
their only legal effect: the duty to comply or explain.87 As expected, all
European supervisory authorities, including the two most important
U.K. financial regulators, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and
the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), declared themselves
compliant.88 They thereby expressed their intent to apply the
nonbinding ESMA-Guidelines when construing the national law that
transposed the European directives. Thus, FCA and PRA will take into
account the content of the ESMA-Guidelines when assessing what
features are required to establish "a permanent and effective
compliance function which operates independently" under their own
mandates.8 9 Failure to meet these requirements will carry enforcement
actions in accordance with the Decision Procedure and Penalties
Manual of the FCA and PRA.90
This example illustrates how our notion of the nonbinding
instruments needs to be revised when it comes to the multilevel system
of the European Union. The ESA Guidelines might be nonbinding of
their own force; however, their embedding in the European regulatory
system endows them with significant legal relevance when applied by
the Member State authorities. Their content becomes law through the
85. Lamfalussy League Table, EUR. COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/finance/securities/docs/
transposition/table en.pdf (last updated Feb. 17, 2016).
86. See ESMA-MIFID, supra note 79, at 25-26.
87. See supra Part I.B.1.
88. See Eur. Sec. & Mkts. Auth. (ESMA), Guidelines Compliance Table,
ESMAJ2013/923 (Apr. 24, 2014),
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2013-923-guidelines-
compliance table-guidelineson certainaspects of the_mifidscompliancefunction_
requirements.pdf.
89. Section SYSC 6.1.3 of the FCA and PRA Handbooks.
90. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., DECISION PROCEDURE AND PENALTIES MANUAL § 1.1(1)(A)
(2016), available at https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/DEPP.pdf
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interpretation of the supervisors. Though decisions by the supervisory
authorities are still contestable in the Member State courts, which are
not bound by the Guidelines, the change in legal relevance is
remarkable. This constitutes the main difference from the soft-law
publications of the Basel Committee, which have to be transposed into
national law by an ordinary legislative procedure. Due to the third-level
status of the ESA Guidelines, they do not require transposition, but can
be introduced via the discretionary enforcement power of the national
supervisory authorities.9 1  Their interpretation and enforcement
authority turns soft law into hard legal requirements for financial
institutions. 92
In some cases the Member State supervisors even use lawmaking
powers to upgrade an ESA-Guideline. This transposition approach
seems to occur in several jurisdictions: ESA Guidelines are republished
91. See van Rijsbergen, supra note 16, at 120. This is the main mechanism for the de
facto legal relevance of the ESA-Guidelines that has until now not received the attention
it deserves. Even thorough studies of the ESA-Guidelines' effects and their de facto
implications stop with the rules on the books and do not consider the enforcement of the
rules. See generally id. at 125-28 (explaining that rules may not be uniformly applied
among Member States). It is not surprising that "[e]ven though in general the FCA
Handbook is presented as a non-binding integration instrument, it is considered by
financial market participants as entailing rules that are binding upon them" if the
respective underlying principles are enforced by the authority publishing the Handbook.
Id. at 128.
92. This 'is the major difference between my argument here and the theory of
incorporated transgovernmental networks laid down by Eberlein & Newman, supra note
11, at 31 et seq. Whereas Eberlein and Newman stress that independence and formal
authority of the Member State authorities are the two major characteristics enabling
incorporated transgovernmental networks to operate as efficiently as they do, see id. at 30,
the example of the ESAs rather suggests that the deep integration of the authorities into
the existing European law is the decisive force responsible for the major impact of their
work. Eberlein and Newman found that "insufficient powers constrain the effectiveness of
authority-based, domestic enforcement." Id. at 44. Because of the ESA-Guidelines' status
as third-level instruments, such constraint does not hinder enforcement by national
authorities. According to incorporated transgovernmental networks theory, national
authorities need a delegation of formal regulatory authority to establish an efficient
coordination, see id., but in the ESA context this power has already been delegated to the
authorities in charge of enforcing the substantive provisions of European financial
markets law. The enforcement powers of regulatory agencies are sufficient to establish a
coordinated approach. What Eberlein and Newman seem not to account for is that the
European actors of global transgovernmental networks and the actors of European
incorporated transgovernmental networks for financial markets law are the same. In
either position they represent the same national supervisory authorities with the same
regulatory capacities. However, the regulatory subjects discussed by the respective
networks differ markedly. Whereas broad-brush coherence needs to be achieved at the
global level, the European level rather deals with a coherent enforcement of already
harmonized rules.
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as national (binding) administrative instruments.93 In these cases the
"hardening" of the European soft law reaches its final stage: ESA
Guidelines become national hard law.
3. Conclusion: High Compliance Levels are Likely
One can safely assume that the risk of noncompliance with the
European Guidelines is not as pressing as it is on the global level. The
strong political pressure toward a more uniform and coherent legislative
framework in the European Union, the specific position of the ESA
Guidelines as third-level measures in the European legislative system,
and the reputational mechanism and coordinating function of the ESAs
will lead to a high compliance rate of national supervisors. The
European legislature has even inserted the compliance pressure into the
wording of the ESA Regulations.
At the Member State level, financial institutions will have no choice
but to obey guidelines when applied by their own supervisors. Their
discretion when applying transposed European financial regulation
turns the soft-law Guidelines into hard law. Even though contestation
in court is still an option, the shift in legal relevance is remarkable. The
European Union seems to have heeded one of the main insights that the
financial crisis has brought: not rules onthe books, but enforcement sets
the tone of efficient regulation.94
C. The Danger of Preponderant Industry Interest
The legitimacy question seems to gain in importance with the
previous finding: the harder a soft-law instrument becomes, the greater
its need for legitimacy. If we look at the ESAs' structure from an
institutional perspective, there seems to be no problem: an independent
93. For an overview of the approach in the Netherlands, see van Gestel & van Golen,
supra note 16, at 767. In Germany, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority recently
published parts of an EIOPA-Guideline as a legally binding Sammelverfiigung (collective
decree). For an English translation, see Federal Financial Supervisory, Collective Decree:
Complaints Management Function and Complaints-Handling of Insurance Undertakings,
BAFIN (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Aufsichtsrecht/EN/Verfuegung/
vf_130920_beschwerdebearbeitungvaen.html. In Sweden, the Financial Supervisory
Authority explicitly states that if it deems "it necessary, guidelines can be reworked into
binding rules in the form of regulations." See MARIE JESPERSON, FINANSINSPEKTIONEN,
MEMORANDUM: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES'
GUIDELINES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (2013), available at www.fi.se/upload/90_
English/20_Publications/20_Miscellanous/2014/pm-eu-riktlinjer. 12-12289eng.pdf.
94. Niamh Moloney, Financial Services and Markets, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
REGULATION 437, 446 (Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, & Martin Lodge eds., 2010).
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agency governed by high government officials that takes into account
stakeholder input and knowledge when regulating via legally
nonbinding instruments. All these features indicate a legitimate
decision procedure. However, even if we do not apply a strict definition
of democratic accountability, which, e.g., dominates the administrative
discourse in the German literature,95 an empirical examination of the
soundly designed features of the ESAs reveals troublesome issues that
raise questions regarding their capability as legitimacy safeguards.
1. Possible Institutional Pathways of Special Interest
Ironically one of the features that has been identified as the major
pathway of unbalanced industry interest was originally designed to
mitigate legitimacy problems at the European level. Each ESA has been
given a Stakeholder Group. These Groups were founded to enhance the
participation of market actors and other stakeholders in the rulemaking
process. This institutional feature is supposed to put the regulatory
work of the ESAs in a position to take into account stakeholder
expertise. As a result, both efficiency and accountability are supposed to
increase. The Stakeholder Groups are regarded as regulatory
interlocutors of the ESAs with a "direct accountability to the public at
95. The prevailing notion of democratic accountability of administrative authorities
among German legal scholars is heavily shaped by the works of great public law scholars:
the constitutional court judges Ernst-Wolfgang Bockenfdrde and Roman Herzog, for
example. Their concept of a "legitimacy chain" (Legitimationskette) today remains one of
the most influential theories of democratic legitimacy. According to this powerful
metaphor a governmental decision is only democratically legitimate if it is connected to
the legitimacy chain that runs from the publicly elected offices, i.e. the German
parliament, down the hierarchy of sovereign power. Such a connection of a lower
governmental office is established by appointment (personal democratic legitimacy) and
power to instruct (substantial democratic legitimacy). For an account in English, see
Michael Haus, Mirror of the State or Independent Image? - Conceptual Perspectives on the
Question of a Legitimacy Shift to the Output Dimension in Local Democracy, 7 URB. RES. &
PRACT. 123 (2014); see also Martin Selmayr, Book Review, 43 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 886,
888 (2006). For an application of the theory to international organizations, see Markus
Krajewski, Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Perspectives of WTO Law, 35 J.
WORLD TRADE 167, 175-76 (2001). Some German scholars harshly criticize the ESA
against the background of this particular notion of democracy. See, e.g., Dirk Looschelders
& Lothar Michael, Europaisches Versicherungsrecht, in EUROPAISCHES SEKTORALES
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT § 11 46 (Matthias Ruffert ed., 2013) (Ger.) ("Ihr Hauptorgan, der
Rat der Aufseher, ist weder auf nationaler noch auf europaischer Ebene durch Wahlen
oder parlamentarische Verantwortlichkeit riickgebunden.") ("Their [the ESAs'] main body,
the Board of Supervisors, is neither on a national nor on a European level legitimized by
elections or by accountability to the parliament.").
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large."96 To serve these purposes, the Groups consist of about thirty
members selected to represent a balanced proportion of interested
parties, such as industry associations, employees, consumers, users, and
academics.97 The Groups have been integrated into the rulemaking
process of the ESAs. Opinions of the Stakeholder Groups have to be
requested in the case of implementing and regulatory technical
standards, and their opinions "shall" be requested when the ESAs draft
guidelines. The ESAs can therefore rely on a steady influx of public
input and expertise when drafting new guidelines. When "appropriate,"
the ESAs are called on to conduct public consultations and to request
the opinion of their respective Stakeholder Group. These requirements
have been taken very seriously by the ESAs: the EIOPA, for instance,
has so far conducted public consultations and requested the opinion of
its Stakeholder Groups in all of its rounds of guideline-drafting.
Even though the Stakeholder Groups are designed to add a
deliberative element,98 recent studies have shown that their input may
not be as balanced as required by the ESA Regulations.99 Iglesias-
Rodriguez even concludes that the design of stakeholder participation
"suggests that the financial industry may have been able to capture
both the legislature and the ESAs, so as to ensure that the advice
provided to the latter in the course of the rulemaking procedures
96. Carmine di Noia & Matteo Gargantini, The European Securities and Markets
Authority: Accountability Towards EU Institutions and Stakeholders 24 (MPILux,
Working Paper No. 2, 2013), available at http://www.mpi.lu/fileadminImpi/medien/
research/DiNoia_GargantiniESMAMPI_WP S_2013-11-25.pdf.
97. ESMA Regulation, supra note 5, at art. 37 2 ("The Securities and Markets
Stakeholder Group shall be composed of 30 members, representing in balanced
proportions financial market participants operating in the Union, their employees'
representatives as well as consumers, users of financial services and representatives of
SMEs.").
98. On the overall democracy-enhancing capabilities of stakeholder participation in the
European Union, see Justin Greenwood, Organized Civil Society and Democratic
Legitimacy in the European Union, 37 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 333 (2007). On the legitimacy-
improving quality of deliberative stakeholder participation from a theoretical perspective,
see Burkhard Eberling & Dieter Kerwer, New Governance in the European Union: A
Theoretical Perspective, 42 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 121, 133-34 (2004). For an instructive
overview of the theoretical and empirical challenges to the deliberative contribution to
European legitimacy, see Yannis Papadopoulos & Philippe Warin, Are Innovative,
Participatory and Deliberative Procedures in Policy Making Democratic and Effective?, 46
EUR. J. POL. REs. 445, 455 et seq. (2007).
99. See ESA Regulations, supra note 5, at art. 37 2 ('The Securities and Markets
Stakeholder Group shall be composed of 30 members, representing in balanced
proportions financial market participants operating in the Union, their employees'
representatives as well as consumers, users of financial services and representatives of
SMEs.").
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sources, predominantly, from the financial industry."10 0 This sweeping
assessment draws from findings that suggest a heavy preponderance of
industry interest in the Stakeholder Groups.
First of all, it has been observed that, due to the "biased"
interpretation of the ESA Regulations, the composition of the Groups
does not make for a balanced representation of all the interests
involved. For example, in most instances consultancy firms have been
nominated to serve on behalf of the "users" of financial services.
However, those firms "provide their own services to financial
institutions" and therefore their interest can be "identified, to a great
extent, with the interest of their main customers."101
The representation issue has already led to a serious clash at the
European level. Following the formal opening of an inquiry by the
European Ombudsman0 2 to investigate an alleged breach of European
law by a biased composition of the Stakeholder Groups, the EBA and
EIOPA chose to dissolve their already established groups and to
reappoint them with a more balanced cast. However, when closing the
inquiry the European Ombudsman could not help but issue a "critical
remark": "The [authorities] failed to ensure an adequate balance
between the representatives of the industry, on the one hand, and those
of users and consumers, on the other hand, when selecting members of
the IRSG and the OPSG."'10 3 A complaint against the ESMA's newly
100. PABLO IGLESIAS-RODRIGUEZ, THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF FINANcIAL REGULATORS - A
EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPEcTIVE 288 (2014). From the beginning, limiting
industry influence in the Stakeholder Groups has been identified as one of the major
problems in this regard. See Moloney, supra note 52, at 80.
101. IGLESIAS-RODRfGUEZ, supra note 100, at 261. The industry's dominance is further
bolstered by the Stakeholder Groups' internal rules of procedure, a combination that is
said to cause an "asymmetric allocation of powers" among their members. Id. at 262--64.
102. The European Ombudsman is an independent official that is elected by the
European Parliament to deal with complaints of the European citizens. See TFEU art.
228. She has no binding legal powers and is only authorized to examine complaints and
report on her investigations to the European Parliament. However, her influence has been
described as politically significant and growing. See Alexandros Tsadiras, The European
Ombudsman's Remedial Powers: An Empirical Analysis in Cortext, 38 EUR. L. R. 52, 57
(2013).
103. Decision of the European Ombudsman Closing Her Inquiries into Complaints
1874/2011/(EIS)LP and 1877/2011/(EIS) LP Against the European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Authority, DER EUROPAIScHE BORGERBEAUFTRAGTE (Feb. 26,
2014), http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/de/cases/decision.faces/en/53669/html.bookmark.
A similar remark can be found in Decision of the European Ombudsman Closing Her
Inquiry into Complaint 1876/2011/(EIS)LP Against the European Banking Authority,
DER EUROPAIScHE BORGERBEAUFTRAGTE (Dec. 19, 2003), http://www.ombudsman.
europa.eu/cases/decision.faces/enI52932/html.bookmark.
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established Stakeholder Group has already been filed. 104
Second, sample analysis of the ESAs' open and public consultations
show that consumer and retail groups are absent from these
processes.105 This observation is in line with studies of consultations of
the Commission.0 6 Whereas "companies from the finance sector,
especially banks" are generally present,0 7 consumer representatives
seem to simply not participate in consultations regarding measures that
do not directly affect consumer-protection matters. This has been
attributed to the high complexity of the matters discussed.108
Complexity might increase participation costs to a level that only well-
resourced industry players can afford. Furthermore, there might be
certain areas in which consumer or user interests are simply not
directly implicated. It is, for instance, hard to extract the consumer-
protection implications of banking-capital or insurance-solvency
requirements without reverting to trivial generalities. This puzzle has
been integrated into the institutional structure of some Stakeholder
Groups: only one of the EIOPA's consumer representatives was a
member of the subgroups concerned with the reform of the Solvency II
regimes.10 9 Stakeholder and public participation in this regard is
therefore reduced to a briefing by industry.
A third point that long has been of rather subordinate interest is the
104. The Composition of ESMA's 30-Member Securities and Markets Stakeholders
Group ("SMSG'9, DER EURoPAIscHE BORGERBEAUFTRAGTE (May 5, 2014),
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/cases/caseopened.faces/en/54250/html.bookmark.
105. See IGLESIAS-RODRIGUEZ, supra note 100, at 266-67 (three case studies). Another
example is the public and open consultation on the Guidelines on Forward Looking
Assessment of Own Risks (based on the Own Risk and Solvency Assessment principles).
All of the 797 comments received by EIOPA were made by either insurers, their interest
groups, or their counsel. See European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority
[EIOPA], Final Report on Public Consultation No.13/009 on the Proposal for Guidelines
on Forward Looking Assessment of Own Risk (2013), available at
https://eiopa.europa.eulPublications/Consultations/EIOPA- 13-
414_FinalReportLonCP09.pdf.
106. See Christian Marxsen, Open Stakeholder Consultations at the European Level-
Voice of the Citizens?, 21 EUR. L.J. 257 (2015).
107. Id. at 269.
108. See IGLESIAS-RODRfGUEZ, supra note 100, at 267. See also Marxsen, supra note 106,
at 278 (additionally blaming a structural deficiency: "In finance and business-related
fields that form the centre of the EU's policies, by contrast, not-for-profit intermediary
organisations are very rare.").
109. See EIOPA, Annual Report 2013: Annex IV-Overview of EIOPA Stakeholder Groups
Membership, at 90-93 (2013), available at https://eiopa.europa.eulPublications/Reports/
Annual_Report_22013_01.pdf. Solvency II is an act that regulates the European insurance
market. Its main parts concern the capital that EU insurance companies are obliged to
hold in order to reduce their risk of insolvency.
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national authorities' personnel.1 ( Whereas the European Commission is
staffed by civil servants who are supposed to spend their professional
lives in the European civil service, the European agencies are mostly
staffed with short-term employees."' The ESAs are not different in this
regard: almost all of their employees are temporary staff. According to
the ESA Regulations, EU staff regulations apply to the ESAs' personnel
as well.112 Those lay down a mandatory one-year and a flexible two-year
cooling-off period for the Chairperson and the Executive Director before
they are allowed to enter the private sector.113 Regular staff members
are only subject to a flexible cooling-off period of two years that must be
expressly triggered by the authorities' Executive Director.114
Furthermore, the authorities compete with an industry that is able to
offer high pay and attractive job prospects. These circumstances lead to
a higher risk of revolving-door problems. The EBA, for example, as a
young and still-growing administrative agency, has an annual staff
turnover of 12.9 percent due to "resignation, contract expiry or
110. See, e.g., IGLESIAS-RODRIGUEZ, supra note 100, at 268-69. These remarks are
focused exclusively on the senior management of the ESA. However, day-to-day work such
as drafting Guidelines and evaluating remarks of Stakeholders will not be done by the
Chair and the Executive Director of the ESA. Those tasks rest with the regular staff of the
authorities.
111. See MARTIJN GROENLEER, THE AUTONOMY OF EUROPEAN UNION AGENCIES 125
(2009).
112. Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants
of the European Community and the European Atomic Energy Community (EEC &
EAEC) No. 31/11 of Jan. 2014, arts. 11, 16 § 3 2014 O.J. (C 45/1385), 19, 21 ("In the case of
former senior officials as defined in implementing measures, the appointing authority
shall, in principle, prohibit them, during the 12 months after leaving the service, from
engaging in lobbying or advocacy vis-A-vis staff of their former institution for their
business, clients or employers on matters for which they were responsible during the last
three years in the service.").
113. Id.
114. Conditions of Employment (EEC & EAEC) No. 31111 of Jan. 2014, art. 112014 O.J.
(C 45/1385), 19; Conditions of Employment (EEC & EAEC) No. 31/11 of Jan. 2014, art. 16
§ 3 2014 O.J. (C 45/1385), 21 ("Officials intending to engage in an occupational activity,
whether gainful or not, within two years of leaving the service shall inform their
institution thereof using a specific form. If that activity is related to the work carried out
by the official during the last three years of service and could lead to a conflict with the
legitimate interests of the institution, the appointing authority may, having regard to the
interests of the service, either forbid him from undertaking it or give its approval subject
to any conditions it thinks fit. The appointing authority shall, after consulting the Joint
Committee, notify its decision within 30 working days of being so informed. If no such
notification has been made by the end of that period, this shall be deemed to constitute
implicit acceptance.").
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termination.""15
2. Cultural Capture
However, these institutional pathways may be only the tip of the
iceberg of industry influence. The financial crisis did not only bring on
massive change to the regulatory system but also an important stimulus
to academic analysis. One of the new fields of academic interest stands
in the tradition of a decades-old concept: cultural capture.116
The underlying theory is said to originate with the works of the
young Samuel P. Huntington in 1952.117 Its basic claim is that regulated
actors "capture" their regulators over time and impose their interests on
them. The economic narrative of capture occurring naturally had a
blunt corruption element to itil8: politicians and administrative officials
design regulations according to the industry's demands in exchange for
votes, resources, and funding."9 But this rather simplistic
interpretation of capture as a quid-pro-quo bargain has over the years
been complemented by a more nuanced view of its structure. Not only
115. European Banking Authority [EBA], Annual Report 2014, at 83 (2015), available at
http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1112872/EBA+2014+Annual+Report.pdf/6dOa
5f50-4d01-4867-bcf3-4fa8091719a4.
116. See Daniel Carpenter, David Moss & Melanie Wachtell Stinnett, Lessons for the
Financial Sector from 'Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence, and How
to Limit it, in MAKING GOOD FINANCIAL REGULATION - TOWARDS A POLICY RESPONSE TO
REGULATORY CAPTURE 70, 74 (Stefano Pagliari ed., 2012) (sounding the bell for a "new
scholarly understanding of regulatory capture").
117. See the famous article by Samuel P. Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The
Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952) (dealing with
the "marasmus" of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), which is considered the
academic starting point of the capture theory). However, it was Marver H. Bernstein in
REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 74 (1955), as well as George J.
Stigler in The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. MANAG. SCI. 3 (1971), who
made the theory of regulatory capture an academic commonplace. For an overview over
the history of the theory, see also William Novak, A Revisionist History of Regulatory
Capture, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE - SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW
TO LIMIT IT 7-9 (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss eds., 2014) [hereinafter PREVENTING
REGULATORY CAPTURE].
118. See James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis [hereinafter Kwak,
Cultural Capture], in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE, supra note 117; David F.
Engstrom, Corralling Capture, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 31 (2012) C'materialist
capture").
119. See Stigler, supra note 117, at 12; see also Richard A. Posner, The Concept of
Regulatory Capture: A Short, Inglorious History, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE,
supra note 117 ("A regulatory program was a commodity purchased by the regulated
industry."); Ernesto Dal B6, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y
203, 212 (2006) ("the regulated firm will use either bribes or some form of coercive
inducement").
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did the perceived aim of capture shift from regulatory to deregulatory
20
but, more importantly, new mechanics of how capture can occur and be
sustained have been explored.
First of all, it has been established that the corrupting mechanism
of capture is of a rather indirect nature: agency officials seldom accept
direct bribes, but want to further their careers and therefore strive to be
on good terms with industry.121 Outright corruption and bribery might
still occur but are the exceptions that prove the rule. "Revolving doors,"
however, are of high importance and might not only be a cause but also
a symptom of another, psychological mechanism of capture.
It was Willem Buiter, who, in the wake of the latest financial crisis,
first argued that the homogenous cultural environment in which
regulatory as well as corporate experts are educated, trained, and
employed might have led to a shared mindset, which naturally resulted
in shared views on regulation.122 In such an environment, capture
occurs not because of criminal or corrupt behavior but because of sincere
conviction and a heavy educational and social bias. This notion of a
"cognitive capture" has been further elaborated by other scholars123 and
120. See Daniel Carpenter, Corrosive Capture?, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE,
supra note 117 (arguing that the traditional notion of capture being used by the industry
as a tool to limit market access is outdated. Industries rather try to avoid or ease
regulations [corrosive or deregulatory capture]). However, these findings are not
undisputed. Richard A. Posner, for instance, argues that the weakening of regulation is
not another version of regulatory capture but rather something completely different. See
Posner, supra note 113, at 49 et seq.: capture, according to his account, means only the
industry's influence on regulations to protect its market share from competition. What at
first looks like a serious attack on the capture mechanisms discussed here, turns out to be
a mere fight about words. Posner does not deny the new shape of influence exerted by the
industry but rather points at the "misleading" placing of the new theory. Capture, as
defined by him, has no room for these new findings. I will, however, use the term "capture"
as it is used by the proponents of the "corrosive capture theory" since a relaxed
terminology seems most promising in this regard.
121. See C. Boyden Gray, Congressional Abdication: Delegation Without Detail and
Without Waiver, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 41, 49 (2012); Stigler, supra note 117, at 13
(offering a different perspective: "Why are so many politicians lawyers? - because
everyone employs lawyers, so the congressman's firm is a suitable avenue of
compensation, whereas physicians would have to be given bribes rather than patronage.").
122. See Willem Buiter, Lessons from the North Atlantic Financial Crisis 36,
http://newyorkfed.orgIresearch/conference/2008/rmm/buiter.pdf ("cognitive regulatory
capture").
123. See generally Kwak, Cultural Capture, supra note 118; see also Lawrence G.
Baxter, "Capture" in Financial Regulation: Can We Channel It Toward the Common
Good?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 175 (2011); James Kwak, Incentives and Ideology,
127 HARV. L. REV. 253 (2014) [hereinafter Kwak, Incentives and Ideology]; Laurence Tai &
Daniel Carpenter, SEC Capture by Revolving Door: Strengths and Weaknesses in the
Evidence Base, 8 L. & FIN. MARKETS REV. 227 (2014); Laurence Tai, Regulatory Capture
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resulted in the notion of "cultural capture."124 According to this
approach, capture is a result not only of material incentives but also of
other mechanisms such as identity, status, and relationships.12 5 The
core argument is that decision-makers are influenced rather
subconsciously by their environment and therefore structurally favor a
certain interest group. Factors such as race, training, and shared
economic priorities (together, identity);126 social, scientific, or economic
achievements (together, status);127 and personal, professional, or other
relationships12s dominate this environment. As a result, regulators are
consistently under the "soft pressure"'29 of the regulated industry and
capture occurs silently and almost inevitably. 130
Cultural capture, therefore, is not fueled by corruption or
dishonesty, but rather by a commitment to certain key priorities shared
among regulators and industry. If this holds true, it casts the role of
expertise in financial regulation in an interesting light: expertise might
and Quality (N.Y.U. Law and Economics Working Papers, Working Paper No. 397, 2014)
available at http:/ilsr.nellco.org/nyu 1ewp/397/; Engstrom, supra note 118.
124. See Kwak, Cultural Capture, supra note 118, at 78 (rightly noting the notion of
"deep capture" as described by Jon Hanson and David Yosifon bears at least some
similarities to cultural capture). Regulatory capture according to the deep-capture
hypothesis is also a rather hidden mechanism that does not involve corrupt behavior on
behalf of the captured. However, in its far-reaching hypothesis that capture is a global
phenomenon that was intentionally created to further commercial interests, it goes far
beyond the rather modest claims of cultural capture. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon,
The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power
Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 229-30 (2003) ("Our basic
hypothesis (and prediction) is that large commercial interests act (and will continue to act)
to capture the situation-interior and exterior-in order to further entrench
dispositionism. Moreover, they have done so largely undetected, and without much in the
way of conscious awareness or collaboration. Hence, large corporate interests have,
through disproportionate ability to control and manipulate our exterior and interior
situations, deeply captured our world.").
125. See Kwak, Cultural Capture, supra note 118, at 80 et seq.
126. See id. at 81-85.
127. See id. at 86-89 (emphasizing that it is of secondary importance in which field such
status is achieved. He specifically names the financial sector, which gained status via
charity, pop-cultural appraisal, and scientific affiliation).
128. See id. at 89-93.
129. Id. at 93.
130. Engstrom, supra note 118, at 33 (arguing that this is a result of the definitional
vagueness of the public-good conception. In his words, it shows "the more general problem
... that virtually any policy position can be framed as furthering the public interest."
Indeed, the deep expertise required to fully understand financial regulations and their
impact on the regulated industry makes their assessment especially hard. Even if a
legislative decision is made laying down what the "public interest" with regard to a
specific financial markets topic is, the guise of expertise can exacerbate the information
asymmetry between legislature and enforcing agency to a point in which the principal's
control becomes a mere myth.).
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always already come "captured" to a certain degree. Regulation in this
field might therefore need a steady, synthetic influx of public interest.
3. Conclusion: Legitimacy Concerns Persist
Unlike the concern for weak enforceability, to which the ESA
Guidelines seem mostly immune, the Guidelines seem not to be immune
to the problems of preponderant industry interest. The institutional
structures of both the ESAs and the regulatory environment of the
financial markets raise the question of whether the authorities are
sufficiently capable of withstanding powerful industry interests. It
seems that consumer input is almost absent in matters that are not
directly related to their concerns. These issues, however, are of high
importance and require balanced input.1 1
Furthermore, research suggests that capture might be a
phenomenon that cannot be reduced to corrupt regulators or to
insufficient postemployment policies of the supervisory agencies. It
rather implies that capture might occur because of shared cultural or
cognitive mindsets. If this is true, supervisory authorities would be
inherently biased and per se give preference to industry-preferred
solutions.
II. ESA GUIDELINES AS NONBINDING RULES
Part I, leaves us with a thought-provoking portrayal of the ESA
Guidelines. They resemble hard law in their effect, but lack the
legitimacy safeguards of the legislative process. Their specific subject
matter, which requires steady industry and expert input, rather seems
to make them especially vulnerable to preponderant industry interest.
Why then did the European legislature resort to this soft-law tool?
It certainly did not introduce the ESA-Guideline as an experiment.
Soft guidance is far from unknown in the European legal sphere. Due to
the open and developing structure of the European Union, European
131. In the same vein, see Marxsen, supra note 106, at 278 ("A lack of public interest
and relevance can certainly not be the reason for such an under-representation. A lack of
public interest might be assumed in regard to very few consultations that address
politically irrelevant subjects. This is, however, certainly not true for many of the
economical issues that were subject of a consultation. The consultations on, for example,
measures to strengthen bank capital requirements, on regulations for credit rating
agencies, or on the pricing of medicine received almost no participation of not-for-profit
groups, although the practical relevance, especially in light of the current economic crisis,
is evident. A public interest is definitely given, but it has not gotten to get organised in a
way that would intervene at the institutional European level.").
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institutions, first and foremost the European Commission, have been
using all sorts of soft guidance tools.1 32 In contrast to the global sphere,
however, the European Union can rely on specific grants of jurisdiction
that entitle the European legislature to regulate the financial markets
by hard law. Over the last years, especially Articles 53 and 114 TFEU
have been used to adopt numerous legislative measures to reform the
financial markets. The European Parliament and Council also delegated
significant legal powers to the Commission, which is in charge of further
defining and shaping the framework legislation.13 However, when
founding the ESAs, the European legislature equipped the three sister
authorities with a soft-law instrument that, in addition to these binding
acts, should shape the financial markets. Against the background of the
existing legal powers this approach seems unusually restrained.
A. Why Soft Law?
An obvious answer to this question is that the ESAs, as European
agencies, might simply be ineligible for legislative powers. Agencies
such as the ESAs are a very common phenomenon in the European
regulatory sphere.13 4 Their legal foundation and range of possible
powers, however, are still an open question. The European treaties do
not include an explicit competence to establish agencies and do not
speak of agency competencies. Until recently it was not even settled
whether Article 114 of the TFEU, the treaty provision on which the
European legislature relied to establish most of the newer European
agencies, could be used to establish institutions that were entitled to
issue binding decisions.135 The ESAs' establishment indirectly led to
long-awaited clarification in this regard by the European Court of
132. For an empirical and dogmatic overview, see Armin von Bogdandy et al., Legal
Instruments in European Union Law and Their Reform: A Systematic Approach on an
Empirical Basis, 23 Y.B. EUR. L. 91 (2004); LINDA SENDEN, SOFT LAW IN EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW (2004).
133. For a discussion of the Lamfalussy procedure see generally supra notes 75-90 and
accompanying text.
134. For a historical overview, see Madalina Busuioc et al., The Phenomenon of
European Union Agencies: Setting the Scene, in THE AGENCY PHENOMENON IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION: EMERGENCE, INSTITUTIONALISATION AND EVERYDAY DECISION-MAKING
3 (Madalina Busuioc et al. eds., 2012).
135. For an introduction into the discussion about Article 114 of the TFEU, see
MADALINA BUSUiOC, EUROPEAN AGENCIES: LAW AND PRACTICES OF ACCOUNTABILITY 15-
18 (2013); see also Elaine Fahey, Does the Emperor Have Financial Crisis Clothes?
Reflections on the Legal Basis of the European Banking Authority, 74 MOD. L. REV. 581
(2010).
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Justice's (ECJ) short-sales-ban ruling (SSBR).136
On a second issue the ECJ proved to be less effective. One of the
most difficult questions in EU administrative law is whether EU
agencies can be entrusted with legislative powers under European law.
Most commentators agree that even if certain decision-making powers
can be delegated to agencies, European law does not provide for a
lawmaking agency.137 This restrictive view is rooted in the Meroni
decision of the ECJ, which dates back over half a century and
n ancient Greek political thought it 'became the political virtue par
discretion which may, according to the use which is made of it, make
possible the execution of actual economic policy" cannot be transferred
to bodies that are not mentioned by the treaties.138 The debate about the
application, implications, and continuing validity of the Meroni
judgment was only partially answered by the SSBR of the ECJ.
First, the court applied the Meroni criteria to the ESMA, affirming
their significance for bodies of public authority that exercise powers
136. The ESAs' extensive powers had been viewed as a massive overreach by the
European legislature, bending the European treaties to and beyond their breaking point.
As a result, the United Kingdom filed an action for annulment against one of the most
controversial competencies: the power to ban short sales. In its judgment, the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that the power to issue binding decisions
could be conferred to a European agency under the provisions of Article 114 of the TFEU,
see Case 270/12, United Kingdom v. Council and Parliament, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX
LEXIS 45-54 (Jan. 22, 2014); for a discussion of the decision, see Carmine Di Noia &
Matteo Gargantini, Unleashing the European Securities and Markets Authority:
Governance and Accountability After the ECJ Decision on the Short Selling Regulation
(CASE C-270/12), 15 EBOR 1 (2014); Miroslava Scholten & Marloes van Rijsbergen, The
Limits of Agencification in the European Union, 15 GERMAN L.J. 1223 (2014); Rob van
Gestel, European Regulatory Agencies Adrift?, 21 MAASTRICHT J. 188 (2014); Craig, supra
note 61, at 201. This granted the ESAs much-needed relief, since the ambiguous legal
situation had hung like the sword of Damocles above their head. See van Gestel & van
Golen, supra note 16, at 774.
137. See BusuIOC, supra note 135, at 19; see also PAUL CRAIG, THE LISBON TREATY: LAW,
POLITICS AND TREATY REFORM 114-15 (2011); HERWIG C.H. HOFMANN ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 241-44 (2011); Michelle
Everson, Good Governance and European Agencies: The Balance, in REGULATION
THROUGH AGENCIES IN THE EU 141, 147-48 (Damien Geradin et al. eds., 2005); Eills
Ferran, Crisis Driven Regulatory Reform: Where in the World Is the EU Going?, in THE
REGULATORY AFTERMATH OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 1, 73 (Eilis Ferran et al. eds.,
2012); Martin Shapiro, Independent Agencies, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 111, 114-16
(Paul Craig & Grdinne de Birca eds., 2d ed. 2011); Takis Tridimas, Financial Supervision
and Agency Power: Reflections on ESMA, in FROM SINGLE MARKET TO ECONOMIC UNION
55, 59-65, 68 (Niamh Nic Shuibhne & Laurence W. Gormley eds., 2012). But see LARISA
DRAGOMIR, EUROPEAN PRUDENTIAL BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 274-76
(2010).
138. Case 9-56, Meroni & Co. v. High Auth. of the European Coal & Steel Cmty., 1958
E.C.R. 133, 152.
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directly conferred on them by the European legislature.139 Second, the
ECJ ruled that, as long as the delegated powers are "circumscribed by
various conditions and criteria which limit" the implied discretion
margin, such delegation meets the Meroni requirements.140 However,
the judgment concerned decision-making powers of the ESMA, which
differ substantially from legislative powers. Thus, even though the ECJ
confirmed that, under European law, agencies can be empowered to
make decisions with legal consequences, it is far from certain that this
also entails the possibility to delegate legislative powers to an agency.1 4'
However, when the ESAs were established in 2011, the SSBR was
not even contemplated. The European legislature, therefore, chose a
very cautious approach to the Meroni doctrine and resorted to a
circumvention technique that respected the wording of the treaty but, at
the same time, gave the ESAs as much legislative influence as
possible.142 Commentators have therefore called the ESAs' competencies
"quasi-rule-making" powers.143 However, even this limited authority
still involves a fairly high number of actors and needs a legislative
mandate to be activated. The ESAs might be in the driver's seat, but
under parental supervision and without a car of their own.
By contrast, ESA Guidelines can be issued by the ESAs without the
interference of any other European actor. Guidelines do not need a
mandate or a prior approval to be published. They are flexible and time-
efficient tools to regulate the financial markets. Their success, however,
leads them steadily to outgrow their original purpose. Even though the
ESA Guidelines are third-level acts under the Lamfalussy procedure, it
139. Case 270/12, United Kingdom v. Council and Parliament, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX
LEXIS 45-54 (Jan. 22, 2014). Because the Meroni decision concerned a private entity
that had been delegated powers by the High Authority, some scholars argued that the
requirements were not applicable to public authorities, while others argued that, at least
in cases in which the European legislature directly conferred powers to an entity, Meroni
did not apply. See DRAGOMIR, supra note 137, at 275-76.
140. Case 270/12, United Kingdom v. Council and Parliament, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX
LEXIS 45 (Jan. 22, 2014).
141. However, some scholars argue that the judgment could be interpreted in this way.
See van Gestel, supra note 136, at 195-96, for a critical analysis of the judgment in that
direction; see also Scholten & van Rijsbergen, supra note 136, at 1255. But see Di Noia &
Gargantini, supra note 136, at 40-41 (giving a rather positive implication).
142. See ESA Regulations, supra note 5, at art. 10 1, art. 15 1. By a special
procedural modification of Article 290 and Article 291 of the TFEU, the ESAs were given
the right to initiate the drafting process of so-called "implementing technical" and
"regulatory technical" standards. These are second-level legal instruments of the so-called
Lamfalussy procedure. See supra notes 75-90 and accompanying text. Though the
Commission still has to endorse those standards to make them binding law, it can only
refuse to do so when the "Union's interests" requires such a refusal.
143. Busuioc, supra note 16, at 115; see also van Gestel & van Golen, supra note 16, at
767 et seq.; Di Noia & Gargantini, supra note 136, at 19; Craig, supra note 61, at 206.
CAPTURING THE ADMINISTRATIVE INFLUENCE
has been observed that ESAs engage in "level-hopping": they lay down
rules that are either not implied in the framework directives or go far
beyond a simple interpretation of existing law.
144 The EIOPA, for
example, will issue a massive regulatory apparatus to phase in the
Solvency II directives145 and in another instance has issued guidelines
that have raised doubts about its lawful rooting in European law.
146
Such level-hopping does not necessarily occur against the will of the
European legislature. The EBA, for example, was requested to issue
guidelines under both the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) and
Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV)
147 that have far-reaching
consequences for banks' capital requirements.
148 ESAs are therefore at
least in some cases using the Guidelines to compensate for a lack of
legislative power.149 But in contrast to the global sphere, these
nonbinding measures become an integral part of a coherent body of
binding provisions and draw legal relevance from that body's authority.
They do not need to be transposed by an elaborate legislative procedure,
but can be enforced by the supervisory authorities through the
application of already existing legal provisions.
B. Rules vs. Principles
A thorough look at the regulatory system shows that the
144. See also Wymeersch, supra note 52, at 276, para. 9.164 ('In some cases there has
been evidence that they are used for bridging the differences of opinions, both at Level 1 or
at the level of delegated regulation.").
145. See Introducing Solvency II, EIOPA, http://archive.eiopa.europa.euactivities/
insurance/solvency-ii/index.html (last modified Dec. 14, 2014) C'Set 1: 'Guidelines relevant
for approval processes, including Pillar 1 (quantitative basis) and internal models,"' and
"Set2: [sic] 'Guidelines relevant for Pillar 2 (qualitative requirements) and Pillar 3
(enhanced reporting and disclosure)'.").
146. See generally Guidelines on Complaints-Handling By Insurance Undertakings
EIOPA-BoS-12/069 (June 14, 2012), available at https://eiopa.europa.eu/Publications/
Guidelines/EIOPA.ComplaintsHandlingGLEN.PDF (making an internal complaint
mechanism a component of a lawful compliance system).
147. These acts implement the Basel III reforms. See Regulation 575/2013, of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on Prudential Requirements for
Credit Institutions and Investment Firms, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 1, 1 [hereinafter CRR];
Directive 2013/36, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on
Access to the Activity of Credit Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit
Institutions and Investment Firms 2013 O.J. (L 176) 338, 338 [hereinafter CRD IV].
148. See, for example, CRR, supra note 147, at art. 128 para. 3, which requires the EBA
to issue guidelines specifying which types of exposures are associated with particularly
high risk and under which circumstances. These items will have to be assigned a 150%
risk weight, id. at art. 128 para. 1., which will have a considerable impact on the capital
requirement of an institution.
149. See van Gestel & van Golen, supra note 16, at 778.
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circumvention of the existing restrictive requirements of European law
might not have been the only reason why the European legislature
chose to establish the ESA Guidelines. Their legal nature as soft law
induces another interesting effect. The interaction of nonbinding
requirements, on the one hand, and the underlying binding law, on the
other, leads to a combination of rule and principle that seems to activate
the benefits of both regulatory techniques.
In the discussion of regulation techniques, the dichotomy of rules
and principles is commonplace. Rules are detailed regulations precisely
laying out the duties and rights of a regulated entity, whereas principles
(or standards)150 stipulate rather broad "regulatory objectives and
values, and regulatees are left free to devise their own system for
serving such principles."151 Previously, the discussion focused mainly on
the shortcomings of a rule-based approach. It has been identified as "too
long and complex to understand readily or to enforce,152 slow, 153
probably expensive,154 and ill informed.155 The often rigid formulation of
rules was said to suffer from "over-" as well as "under-inclusiveness."156
Therefore, it was not surprising that the principles-based approach
became the international and European model of choice for regulating
150. As to terminology, the terms principle and standard are often used interchangeably
when describing regulatory technique. The U.S. discussion in particular uses the term
standards when describing "instruments which encourage the 'pursuit or achievement of a
value, a goal or an outcome, without specifying the action(s) required' to achieve this in
contrast with a legal rule," see Colin Scott, Standard-Setting in Regulatory Regimes, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 104, 105 (Robert Baldwin et al. eds., 2010). This
Article will use the term principle, because this term is the more common in this
European context. For a detailed discussion of the terminology, see Lawrence A.
Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of "Principles-Based Systems" in
Corporate Law, Securities Regulation and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411, 1418-19
(2007).
151. ROBERT BALDWIN, MARTIN CAVE & MARTIN LODGE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION:
THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 302 (2d ed. 2012).
152. Id. at 230.
153. See Moloney, supra note 94, at 440 (explaining how the rapid growth and
innovation in financial markets over the past 30 years have made it difficult for
regulations to keep pace).
154. For an economic analysis, see ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND
ECONOMIC THEORY 166 passim (2d ed. 2004).
155. See BALDWIN, CAVE & LODGE, supra note 151, at 231. For an economic analysis of
rule-making, see generally Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974) (exploring the four cost dimensions of
rule-making, rule enforcement, rule compliance, and rule violation).
156. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 31-34 (1993).
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financial markets.157 Even though a "pure" principles-based system was
never established, the effort of the European legislature to observe the
essentials of principles-based regulation was clearly noticeable.
158
Indeed, a principles-based approach to regulation promised a staggering
number of benefits. First of all, in multilevel governance structures such
as the European Union, a principles-based approach left national
regulators with enough choices to engage in regulatory competition with
one another.59 Even more importantly, this style of regulation promised
a more flexible regulator in "rapidly innovating financial markets."'
160 It
was seen as a new "bargain" between the regulators and industry that
provided market participants with room for maneuver to increase
efficiency but without discharging them from their legal duties'61-a
concept which also structurally included knowledge and resources of the
regulated entity162 and which was therefore sometimes simply called
"smart regulation."'163
The financial crisis called these hopes into question. Certain
developments such as "gold-plating" or regulatory regionalism, which
are made possible by principles-based regulation, have been identified
as reasons for the catastrophic failure of European financial regulation
during the crisis.164 However, scholars are cautious to condemn
principles-based regulation wholesale, as the alternative is still deemed
to be ineffective and inefficient.165
157. See Moloney, supra note 94, at 447-48. See generally Julia Black, Forms and
Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation, 3 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 425 (2008) (providing an
overview of principles-based regulation).
158. See, e.g., Black, supra note 157 (describing the principle-favoring mood on the
European level in general); see also Borut Stra~iiar, Is Principle Based Legislation Smart
Choice for Capital Market's Regulation?, 1 J. GOVERNANCE & REG. 107 (2012) (for the
capital markets sector); Michel Dacorogna & Philippe Keller, SCOR, Principle-Based
Solvency: A Comparison Between Solvency II and the Swiss Solvency Test (2010),
available at https://www.scor.com/images/stories/pdf/scorpapers/scor-paperssst-and-
solvency-jiva2.pdf (for the insurance sector).
159. See Moloney, supra note 94, at 452.
160. Moloney, supra note 94, at 448. For a discussion of the cost-saving nature of
principles when it comes to altering legal requirements, see Emanuela Carbonara &
Francesco Parisi, Bargaining for Legal Harmonization: Jurisdictional Competition and
Legal Obsolescence, in INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE LAW AND ITS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
339, 348 (Thomas Eger et al. eds., 2008).
161. See Black, supra note 157, at 430.
162. See Moloney, supra note 94, at 447.
163. See Black, supra note 157, at 431.
164. See DRAGOMIR, supra note 137, at 153 passim; Ferran, supra note 137, at 42
passim.
165. See, e.g., Cristie Ford, Principle-Based Securities Regulation in the Wake of the
Financial Global Crisis, 55 McGILL L.J. 257, 306 (2010) ("The [Global Financial Crisis]
contains cautionary lessons about the risks associated with principles-based regulation
489
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By contrast, the European legislature seemed to drastically change
its approach. One of the main aims of its massive regulatory program is
to establish a "consistent application of legally binding Union acts" and
to prevent further "regulatory arbitrage."'166 The European Union's
principles-based approach and its concomitant empowerment of
industry actors today is shaped by a more cautious plan of action.167 An
unprecedented wave of regulation has flooded the financial markets.
However, the European legislature mostly resorted to directives, which
are not directly applicable to the Member States but have to be
transposed into respective national law. The desired degree of coherence
is supposed to be achieved by second- and third-level measures.168 But
the ESAs' third-level acts have been "upgraded": the ESAs are
authorized to issue nonbinding guidelines that, despite their soft-law
nature, have certain legal implications.169  Consequently these
guidelines are meant to be one of the central means of "ensuring the
common, uniform and consistent application of Union law."'70 The
content of most ESA Guidelines qualifies them as perfect examples of
rules, as they contain detailed requirements for both national
supervisory authorities and thereby market participants.
C. ESA Guidelines as Supervisory Default
However, it is far from certain that the European legislature once
again has completely turned to a rules-dominated style of regulation.
Against the background of the rules-vs.-principles discussion and its
almost entirely functional perspective, ESA Guidelines as nonbinding
when it is not reinforced by a meaningful regulatory presence. However, the response
cannot be a knee-jerk reversion to either a more rules-based or a more command-and-
control approach. Principles-based regulation accompanied by input from industry was a
direct response to a situation where regulators were underinformed, always playing catch-
up, and made fools not only by Enron-style corporations engaging in 'loophole behaviour',
but also (to harken back to the negative image of 1970s bureaucracies) by their own rigid,
seized-up processes.").
166. See ESA Regulations, supra note 5, at art. 8 1(b). For an analysis of the overall
rather critical perception of principles-based regulation after the financial crisis from the
British perspective, see Moloney, supra note 94, at 448-49.
167. See Moloney, supra note 94, at 447-49; see also KATHARINA GAMHARTER, THE
EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISORS: INTERACTION WITH ACTORS AT MEMBER
STATE LEVEL: NOTES FROM AUSTRIAN BANKING PRACTICE 303, 312-13, 317 (2012)
(Austria).
168. Second-level instruments are both delegated and implementing acts that are issued
by the European Commission, and in some instances prepared by the ESA. For a short
description of the Lamfalussy process, see supra notes 75-90 and accompanying text.
169. See supra Part I.B.2.
170. ESA Regulations, supra note 5, at art. 16 1.
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rules constitute their own category. Even though they are clearly not
inspired by a principles-based regulatory approach, their legal nature as
soft law endows them with a flexibility that recalls principles-based
governance. Indeed, if we take a close look at the two-part structure
that constitutes the specific regulatory technique of the ESA Guidelines,
we can observe an arrangement hat, at least in theory, combines the
strengths of both rules and principles.
Most ESA Guidelines are issued to specify the requirements of
legally binding acts which, in their broad wording, seem principle-like.
ESA Guidelines have the capability to establish a common
understanding about these requirements and at the same time leave
national supervisors with at least some room to maneuver. The
underlying legally binding requirements remain principles only, but
have been further specified and given a more concrete meaning. The
Guidelines draw their limited legal significance from the underlying
principle. Their de facto relevance is established by their application,
which at the same time is the application of the underlying principle.
However, they remain de jure insignificant. Neither courts nor
supervisors are bound by them directly.171 If the perspective of legal
relevance is added to the analysis of ESA Guidelines as rules, a specific
set of characteristics arises that does not fit the common rules-
principles dichotomy. It rather seems as though the functional profile of
the Guidelines lies somewhere between the rigid rule and the flexible
principle. It constitutes a supervisory default and hence may be a
hybrid regulation technique. At the European level, specific
requirements are laid down that, from the perspective of the regulated
entity, turn into binding supervisory decisions at the national level. The
regulator therefore activates all benefits of a rules-based regulation
172:
certainty about legal requirements, a clear signal to regulated entities of
what is expected of them, and a proactive construction of the law as it
should be applied. At the same time, due to the nonbinding nature of
the Guidelines, supervisory authorities and courts are still able to
retreat to the underlying principles if they are convinced that the
Guidelines do not reflect their regulatory content entirely. This
mitigates the major weakness of a rules-based regulation: over- and
underinclusiveness.
171. Of course there can be indirect constitutional effects that can lead to a certain
degree of self-binding when a supervisor is applying the Guidelines. This, however,
remains a question that has to be answered by each Member State. For a short discussion
of the European law, see infra Part IV.A.
172. For an instructive overview of the benefits of rules-based regulation see Ehrlich &
Posner, supra note 155, at 262-67; see also Carbonara & Parisi, supra note 160, at 348
(providing a shorter overview but in the same vein).
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III. ESA GUIDELINES AND SUBJECTIVITY
If we take the discussion above into consideration against the
background of the increasing number of legislative interventions with
regard to the organizational structure of financial institutions, an
interesting picture unfolds. The internal configuration of financial
institutions has always been the most important part of European
financial regulation. In the field of banking, for example, the European
legislature took a "gradualist approach" that focused on the licensing
system of banks in order to give effect to the freedom of service and
establishment.173 To further bolster trust in the stability of banks
entering national markets via passports, the European Union
harmonized capital requirements and supervision.174 When the Basel
regime was adopted in the European Union, it added its own
sophistication to the regulations, making a certain regulatory technique
a core element of European banking law. This technique has been called
"subjectivity regulation." Subjectivity as substantive programming of
legal entities implies a more intrusive approach to regulation. It aims at
creating a certain organizational fabric of the regulatory target by
defining its inner structure. It thereby seeks to predetermine acts of the
regulated entity rendering traditional instruments of regulation
redundant.175
In the special circumstances of the ESA Guidelines this leads to a
number of frictions, which are illustrated in the following sections.
There are three main issues that gain importance in light of subjectivity
regulations. First, the supervisory default of the ESA Guidelines might
be too "sticky." Second, seemingly illegal organizational requirements
might take the form of the judicially incontestable Guidelines. Third,
since subjectivity in this regard does not only aim at purposely changing
its subjects but also deliberately grants stakeholders influence in the
drafting process of the nonbinding Guidelines, financial institutions are
likely to dominate Guideline-drafting procedures in areas important to
them.
173. See CHARLES PROCTOR, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 22
2.07 (2010).
174. See id.
175. See Mika Viljanen, Making Banks on a Global Scale: Management Based
Regulation as Agencement, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 425 (2016) (analyzing
management based regulation and the rules of the International Capital Adequacy
Assessment Program with agencement theory in order to demonstrate how such rules
seek to change their subjects' behavior).
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A. Subjectivity and Regulatory Technique
Guidelines, as legally nonbinding instruments, have been identified
as a default that can be characterized as a mixture of rules and
principles. Most of them are as detailed as rules but all of them lack the
legally binding character that is one of the essential features of rules.
They therefore draw from the legal validity of the underlying principle
to establish their legal effect. Their impact is mainly dependent on their
"stickiness": if they are too sticky, they resemble rules and might fall
prey to their structural deficiencies.
In the area of organizational requirements, guidelines seem to be of
particular value as they enable the European supervisors to establish
certain specific duties that need to be followed to comply with broad
compliance and capital requirements without excluding different
solutions that meet those requirements as well. This could prove
especially useful when we are talking about subjectivity regulation. If
the inner configuration of financial legal entities such as banks and
insurance firms is supposed to ensure their stability and predetermine
their actions by using its individual information to calculate a certain
modulation, a flexible approach would enable supervisors to fine-tune
the settings under the individual circumstances. Especially in the
diverse environment of the European Single Market with its wide array
of different financial institutions, this approach provides a valuable
source of regulatory flexibility. A European "common sense" can be
established without running the risk of overenforcement. Furthermore,
the soft-law approach could enable supervisors to deviate from the ESA
Guidelines in cases in which their default cannot sufficiently enforce the
underlying principle.
As discussed above, the ESA Guidelines currently create a strict de
facto regime at the European level, which makes deviation
improbable.176 This compliance pressure takes effect not only at the
European level but also on their specific application at the national
level. Some national supervisors such as the German BaFin
177
transform the Guidelines into legally binding instruments.
178 It can also
be observed that some national supervisors such as the BaFin and the
Austrian FMA179 are legally obliged by national law to apply the
176. See supra Part I.B.3.
177. BaFin (Bundesanstalt fir Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht) is the German financial
markets supervisory authority.
178. See supra note 93.
179. FMA (Finanzmarktaufsicht) is the Austrian financial markets supervisory
authority.
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Guidelines.180 Even if such enforcement duties do not exist by law,
national supervisors seem to understand the nonbinding Guidelines as
interpretations of the law that, when applied, have the same legal
effects as a binding act would. The default character of the ESA
Guidelines cannot be taken into account by this regime. Such a setting
might not leave enough room to adapt to specific circumstances of the
individual financial institution. This leads to a configuration under
which the Guidelines resemble rules in their effect and therefore
become over- and underinclusive.
B. Subjectivity and Judicial Accountability
The turn from only factual effects on national supervisors to legal
effects in the relation between national supervisors and financial
institutions leads to another problem. The enforcement power of the
national supervisors endows the Guidelines with legally binding effects
and thereby enables regulation by an instrument that is not contestable
at the European level. According to the TFEU, only such measures can
be reviewed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) as
are intended to produce legal effects vis-A-vis third parties.'18 ESA
Guidelines, however, are legally nonbinding. That leads to the rather
obvious conclusion that the ESA Guidelines are not contestable before
the CJEU. The ESAs are therefore able to heavily shape the internal
organization of financial institutions by the means of mere nonbinding
tools that are not subject to European judicial review. 8 2
180. Compare BANKWESENGESETZ [BWG] [BANKING ACT] BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL]
No. 184/2013, as amended, § 69 5 (Austria) ("Zu diesem Zweck hat sich die FMA an den
Tatigkeiten der EBA zu beteiligen .. . die Leitlinien und Empfehlungen und andere von
der EBA beschlossenen MaJ3nahmen anzuwenden.") ("For that purpose the FMA has to
work together with the EBA . . . apply Guidelines and recommendations and other
measures that have been issued by EBA.") (requiring the authority to apply the ESA
Guidelines) with KREDITWESENGESETZ [KWG] [BANKING ACT], Jul. 10, 1961,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil 1 [BGBL I], last amended by Gesetz [G], Feb. 24, 2012, BGBL I
at 206, art. 2, § 7b(1) 3 (Ger.) ("Sie wendet die Leitlinien und Empfehlungen der
Europaischen Bankenaufsichtsbehorde und der Europaischen Wertpapier- und
Marktaufsichtsbehorde bei Anwendung dieses Gesetzes an.") ("It [the BaFin] applies the
Guidelines and recommendations of the European Banking Authority [EBA] and the
European Securities and Markets Authority [ESMA] when applying this act.")
(implementing a slightly weaker duty).
181. TFEU art. 263, 1.
182. An important question, which will not be considered here, is whether the "comply
or explain" mechanism has sufficient legal effect so as to make the Guidelines judicially
contestable for Member States and European institutions. In contrast to mere individuals,
these institutions are privileged when it comes to contestation of European Union law.
Their actions for annulment are not limited to such acts that are "of direct and individual
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This situation became a hotly debated issue during the rejection of
EIOPA's "Guidelines on Complaints-Handling by Insurance
Undertakings" by the insurance industry.
8 3 These Guidelines, applying
certain very broad compliance requirements of the Solvency II Directive,
provided that insurers were obliged to establish an internal complaint-
management process.84 German insurance firms were convinced that
this constituted regulatory overreach by EIOPA. The German
supervisory authority BaFin did not agree, but instead complied with
the Guidelines and published a legally binding collective decree
(Sammelverfiigung) addressed to German insurers that required them
to implement the internal process.85 Even though the collective decree
can be contested in a German court, the situation is regarded as
unsatisfactory, especially when considered against the fact that ESA
Guidelines enjoy a presumption of lawfulness in German courts.
186 To
contest the content of the ESA Guidelines, insurance firms must bring
an action of annulment in a German court and pursue this action until
the German court of last resort is legally obliged to bring the matter
before the CJEU as a preliminary ruling under the TFEU. Such a
procedure is likely to take years and, even if successful, to be only of
limited help.187
Furthermore, judicial review by a national court could once again
lead to diverging interpretations of European law if the court finds that
the interpretation laid down in the ESA Guidelines violates the Member
State's law. The duty to bring a legal question before the CJEU only
applies to lower courts if the validity of an act is in question. However,
ESA Guidelines, as soft law, are no such acts. This could once again lead
to a grab-bag of interpretations and would run contrary to the central
aim of the ESA Guidelines: harmonization.
concern to them." However, this required "personal concern" generally excludes legal and
natural persons from a contestation based on the Member States' "comply or explain"
mechanism. See TFEU art. 263 4.
183. EIOPA, Guidelines on Complaints-Handling By Insurance Undertakings, EIOPA-
BoS-12/069 (Jun. 14, 2012) [hereinafter ComplaintsGL].
184. Id. li.
185. See BaFin, supra note 93.
186. See Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BverwG] [Supreme Administrative Court] May 24,
2011, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FORVERWALTUNGSRECHT [NVWZ] 1012 (1015) 2011 (Ger.).
187. A preliminary-decision procedure is only limited to the questions presented to the
CJEU. See TFEU art. 267. Furthermore, it does not publicly denounce a certain act as
legally invalid but rather answers a legal question inter partes. Moreover, a duty of the
national courts to initiate a preliminary-decision procedure only exists if the question is
raised in "a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose
decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law." Id. art. 267 T 3.
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C. Subjectivity and Interest Politics
Another facet of the already complex picture is the special position
that the Guideline-drafting procedure grants to financial institutions.
They are not only dominant in the Stakeholder Groups and in open and
public consultations, but might also be able to enhance this influential
position even further through a shared cultural mindset with the
authorities' personnel.188 What might be troublesome in most instances
turns into an even more pressing issue when it comes to the Guidelines.
Those soft-governance tools are not only "harder" than their design
suggests, but they also lack most procedural safeguards that ensure a
balanced public-interest representation. Whereas ESAs are either just
consulting authorities in the legislative process or subject to the veto-
power of the European Parliament and Council, the ESA Guidelines are
an instrument with no other accountability mechanisms attached.
In the case of the long-awaited Solvency II reform, for example, the
EIOPA will publish two sets of guidelines that are supposed to "phase
in" the new Solvency II regime, which will have taken full effect in
January 2016. As an already-published set of preparatory guidelines
has shown,8 9 it can be safely assumed that insurers and their interest
groups will be almost entirely on their own in the open and public
consultations. The Stakeholder Groups of the EIOPA will not lead to a
diversified look on the matter either, since the stakeholder subgroups
concerned with the Solvency II reform are almost exclusively occupied
by representatives of the industry and professional associations.190
Against the background of possible cultural capture, this constellation
becomes even more concerning because neither an ex ante nor an ex
post check by the European legislature is part of the Guideline-drafting
procedure. Even though the EIOPA is only "phasing in" the
requirements laid down by the European legislature, its interpretative
preassessment of the norms will have a huge impact on actual
supervisory practice. Even if the enforcement sets a tone of good
regulation,191 it will be tuned without civil society.
IV. HOW TO COPE WITH ESA GUIDELINES
The three problems discussed above could be addressed by a wide
188. See supra Part I.A.
189. Insurers, their interest groups, or their counsel comprised all of the 797 comments
received by EIOPA in the public and open consultation on the Guidelines on Forward
Looking Assessment of Own Risks (based on the ORSA principles). See supra note 105.
190. See supra Part I.C.l.
191. Moloney, supra note 94.
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range of measures. I limit my suggestions to rather modest legal and
institutional reforms. Relying on already-existing case law and legal
literature, it will be shown that just a few changes might lead to a more
feasible setting of the ESA Guidelines.
A. Sophisticated Noncompliance
Even though the ESA Guidelines have been procedurally upgraded
to become quasibinding, their legal nature as nonbinding rules should
leave national supervisory authorities, as well as market participants,
room to maneuver. Some commentators even advocate a "non-
compliance culture,"192 or a more principles-based approach to ESA-
Guideline regulation.1 93 I would not go as far. The Guidelines should
represent the currently enforced legal requirements in most cases. The
ESA Regulations clearly state that ESA Guidelines are meant to be
means of a "common, uniform and consistent application" of EU law-a
purpose that can only be served when Guidelines are consistently
followed. According to some scholars, however, ESA Guidelines should
not be enforced in so-called "exceptional cases." This view convincingly
claims to follow the precedents of the ECJ. The Court has ruled that,
even though the European Commission is bound by its own
administrative practices after they have been published, it still may
depart from a practice if departure is justified by legitimate reasons.
19 4
Such an "exemption clause" takes into consideration the administrative
root of the ESA Guidelines, which are meant to be an interpretive tool
that lacks the binding quality of legal rules. Furthermore, it mitigates
the risk of overinclusiveness, which is brought upon the ESA Guidelines
by their rule-like design.195
However, the acknowledgement of an "exceptional case" by a
192. JUrgen Biurkle, Auswirkungen von EIOPA-Leitlinien auf die Compliance in
Versicherungsunternehmen, 13 VERSICHERUNGSRECHT [VERSR] 529 passim (2014) (Ger.).
193. See, e.g., Di Noia & Gargantini, supra note 136, at 47 ('De lege lata, a similar result
could be achieved by framing guidelines and recommendations so as to explicitly provide
for some margins of monitored variance regarding specific contentious issues, and by
calibrating supervisory measures in a flexible manner.").
194. This line of precedent originated in the field of European antitrust law. See, e.g.,
Case C-226/11, Expedia Inc. v. Autorit6 de la concurrence and Others, 2012 EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS 795; Case C-439/11 P, Ziegler S.A. v. Comm'n, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX
LEXIS 513; Case C-189/02 P et. al., Dansk Rrindustri v. Comm'n, 2005 ECR 1-5488 209
(concerning state aid law). Sources of the indirect legal relevance of the Commission's
nonbinding administrative publications are the principle of equal treatment and the
protection of legitimate expectations. See SENDEN, supra note 132, at 401 (providing an
instructive discussion). Whether this precedent is applicable to the ESA is still an open
question and has not yet been decided by the ECJ.
195. See supra note 156.
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national authority will by definition remain the exception. Furthermore,
such acknowledgement will require a significant persuasive effort by the
market participant. If the Guidelines impose costly interpretations of
binding requirements, they will be intensively scrutinized and possible
alternatives will be subject to a detailed examination. Market
participants will analyze the underlying legal requirements and search
for a more efficient, individual solution. Subjectivity in this regard does
not only lead to change in an organization but also to an intensive
internal dialogue in the organization that might result in a higher
compliance rate and an overall higher efficiency of the regulation.
This "exemption clause" for exceptional cases should be stated in the
ESA Regulations or the Guidelines. A single instance of noncompliance
should not qualify a national supervisory authority as noncompliant
under the ESA Regulations, and therefore should not be subject to the
name-and-shame mechanism. However, in order to ensure that the
''exemption clause" is not abused by Member States to conceal serious
noncompliance, the supervisory authority should be obliged to explain
its deviation to the ESA and give the reasons for its application of the
exemption clause. In such cases a sufficient explanation would not lead
to publication. On the other hand, if a Member State authority cannot
sufficiently explain its deviation, noncompliance should be assessed by
the Board of Supervisors and published. National transposition of the
ESA Guidelines by law-individual enactment of Guidelines as well as
enforcement duties laid down by national law-should also embody such
an "exemption clause."
B. Intended Effects According to Article 263 of the TFEU
Another important concern of commentators discussing the ESA
Guidelines is the question of judicial review. European coherence, as
well as the transformative effects of administrative enforcement, point
in favor of direct European contestability of the ESA Guidelines.
European law, however, does not allow for this.196 The literature has
tried to establish certain indirect legal effects, drawing from case law
like Grimaldi97 and from the binding implications that Guidelines may
196. Guidelines are nonbinding by definition, and the Court of Justice of the European
Union may only review acts "intended to produce legal effects." TFEU art. 263.
197. See Case C-322/88, Grimaldi v. Fonds des maladies professionnelles, 1989 E.C.R.
4416, 18 ("The national courts are bound to take recommendations into consideration in
order to decide disputes submitted to them, in particular where they cast light on the
interpretation of national measures adopted in order to implement them or where they are
designed to supplement binding Community provisions."); see also Case C-207/01, Altair
Chimica SpA, 2003 E.C.R. 1-8894, 41 (affirming the Grimaldi decision); Case C-55/06,
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cause together with the principle of equal treatment and the protection
of legitimate expectations.198 But it is highly uncertain that the CJEU
will accept such indirect legal consequences as sufficient, which until
now have only been assigned to the ESA Guidelines by academia. Legal
cognizability on these grounds would open the way for judicial review
not only of the ESA Guidelines but also of all other soft-law instruments
that are published by European institutions.
It therefore might be more expedient to study existing case law. In a
certain line of precedents the ECJ has accepted for judicial review soft-
law instruments of the Commission as "an act intended to have legal
effects of its own."199 Even though this wording is similar to that of
Article 263 of the TFEU, the meaning given to it by the ECJ could not
be more different. Here, the ECJ held that it was sufficient for a "legal
effect" that the measure went beyond already existing legal
requirements.200 According to this argument, a mere interpretation of
legal requirements does not constitute a legal effect. If, however, the
Commission did not only explain the current legal regime but rather
added certain substantive elements to it, the ECJ held that the
Commission intended to bring about legal effects.
201 Of no relevance
whatsoever was the fact that the Commission did not have the legal
power to change the relevant law. The European General Court ruled
that, even if the Commission expressly called the measures "not
binding," legal effects could have been intended. "Accordingly, the mere
fact that, as the Commission contends, an interpretative communication
does not - by its form, its nature or its wording - purport to be a
measure intended to produce legal effects is not enough to support the
conclusion that it does not produce binding legal effects."
20 2 This line of
precedent, however, is limited to rather narrow exceptions. It is unlikely
Arcor AG & Co. v. Deutsche Telekom, 2008 E.C.R. 1-2976. However, this line of precedent
was established in regard to recommendations by the Commission, the initial drafting
institution of almost all European acts. It is not certain that it can also be applied to the
ESA-Guidelines. Some scholars are of this opinion and furthermore state that these
indirect legal effects are sufficient to establish "legal effects" within the meaning of Article
263 of the TFEU. See Inga Kawka, Comment, Commission Guidelines on Market Analysis
and the Assessment of Significant Market Power Do Not Impose Obligations on
Individuals, 2012 Y.B. ANTITRUST REG. STUD. 275, 279-80 (2012).
198. See supra note 193. This line of precedent is more likely to be applied to the ESA,
although the ECJ has not yet acknowledged such indirect legal effects as sufficient,
relying instead on direct, original legal effects. TFEU art. 263.
199. Case C-57/95, France v. Comm'n, 1997 E.C.R. 1-1640 23. See also Case C-303/90,
France v. Comm'n, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5340; Case C-325/91, France v. Comm'n, 1993 E.C.R. I-
3303; Case T-258/06, Germany v. Comm'n, 2010 E.C.R. 11-2033.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Case T-258/06, Germany v. Comm'n, 2010 E.C.R. 11-2033 29.
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that it will lead to the contestability of all ESA Guidelines, but in rare
circumstances cognizability might be established. Guidelines that
significantly deviate from the wording of the European law could be
interpreted as being "intended to have legal effects of its own." An
action for review by private parties should be cognizable under such
circumstances.203
C. Preponderant Industry Influence
By far the most difficult question is how to counter preponderant
industry influence. Industry input is unquestionably indispensable for
an efficient regulation of financial markets. A certain degree of industry
influence in the Guideline-drafting procedures is therefore necessary
and welcome. However, it will prove impossible to exactly locate the line
that separates due from undue influence. Only extreme aberrations can
be identified. Structural advantages such as dominance in stakeholder
committees, or exclusive stakeholder representation when it comes to
vital regulations such as Solvency II, come close to crossing this line.
Such preponderant influence is, however, easy to mitigate. Industry
stakeholders could, for instance, be granted fewer seats in the
Stakeholder Groups. A more radical approach would be to deny industry
203. Such cognizability would require further action by the European legislature.
According to Article 263, only Member States and the Parliament, Commission, Council,
and Central Bank may bring an action without meeting further requirements. See TFEU
art. 263. Natural or legal persons, however, need to be directly and individually concerned
by the acts without further implementation measures. Id. This standard is hard to meet
for most private entities.
A meaningful judicial-review regime would therefore need an extension by a special
review procedure as had been put in place under Art. 230 EC for binding agency actions.
Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 230, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325)
126. Readers familiar with European law might object and cite the very restricted
possibilities for natural and legal persons to bring an action for annulment against a
directive. In general, only Member States and European institutions are entitled to
contest a directive. Only they are addressed by directives, as only Member State
authorities are addressed by Guidelines. Why then should ESA-Guidelines be treated
differently? The answer lies in the special transposition system induced by directives. A
European directive is supposed to only lay down certain fundamental provisions and to be
transposed into national law by the national legislature, which in most instances will add
certain requirements and compile an independent transposition law. Therefore, even
though in most instances the core principles of a directive are part of a transposition law,
it still is a genuine Member State law. In contrast to directives, ESA-Guidelines are not
transposed into Member State law by a legislative process. They remain European soft
law that is applied by the Member State authorities. Thus, the ESA Regulations should
establish an internal European review procedure, which enables natural and legal persons
to bring an action of annulment against such Guidelines as are "intended to have legal
effects of their own."
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representatives membership in the Groups altogether. Industry seems
sufficiently represented in the open and public consultation process.
Furthermore, most ESAs have established standing committees as
subcommittees of the Board of Supervisors, which are also said to be
dominated by industry representatives.2 4 However, such measures will
not ensure a reduction of industry interest. Rather, it is likely that they
will cause a shift of the influence-channels toward a more opaque
system. It seems more important to ensure that a balanced proportion of
equally influential stakeholders is selected to serve on the Stakeholder
Groups.
If an exclusion of the most dominant interest group will not lead to a
more balanced input, a strengthening of weaker interest groups might
do so. Scholars have suggested that certain financial and organizational
assistance could bolster meaningful nonindustry representative
participation.205 Within the ESAs, a meaningful contribution to this goal
would be to raise the financial support that nonindustry stakeholders,
such as consumers and end-users, receive to enable their participation.
Furthermore, administrative support could be granted and staff could
be provided to support the civil society representatives to cope with the
extensive workload of the Stakeholder Groups. This could enable
representatives of organizations with rather scarce resources to
contribute more meaningful input. However, even if such measures
were adopted, civil society input would be mostly limited to consumer-
protection questions. It has been observed that important structural
questions with no direct consumer implications seem not to be dealt
with by consumer representatives. This touches on an important issue:
consumer representatives are not the equivalent of civil society. The
Stakeholder Groups are not meant to be the substitute for an absent
legislative procedure. Even if consumer representatives might be close
to the "average citizen" (since all citizens are consumers), they are not
representative of the European Union citizen. Their representation
focuses on consumer-protection matters to the exclusion of other issues.
Those other issues might be of great relevance to the general public but
do not carry direct consumer implications. However, this leads to a
systematic shortfall of nonindustry input in certain cases, which
becomes even more worrisome against the background of the important
204. See IGLESIAS-RODRfGUEZ, supra note 100, at 267-68.
205. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and
Empowerment, 16 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 435, 474 (1991) (suggesting "NGO empowerment");
Christine Farnish, Ensuring the Consumer Voice Is Heard, in MAKING GOOD FINANCIAL
REGULATION: TOWARDS A POLICY RESPONSE TO REGULATORY CAPTURE 181, 185-86
(Stefano Pagliari ed., 2012) (suggesting an industry-financed "formal external consumer
voice").
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role ESA Guidelines have been given.
The question of how to mitigate the lack of participation from civil
society in vital Guideline-drafting procedures is a difficult one. To
ensure a reasonable level of legitimacy and at the same time leave an
effective regime of Guidelines intact, it seems most suitable to limit an
additional path of influence to interest representation and observation.
For example, a procedure that entails the requirement of the
responsible ESA staff to brief a member of the relevant parliamentary
committee during the various stages of the drafting process could be
established. This would ensure that the views of the European citizens'
representative, who in most cases will have been deeply involved in the
drafting process of the underlying European law, are made known to the
ESA. Furthermore, it could also serve as a "policing" tool206 of the
European Parliament, which in turn could use ESAs' reporting
duties,207 parliamentary budget powers,20s and its legislative powers to
push for its view.
CONCLUSION
As a result of the financial crisis, the European Union has
implemented a more coherent and harmonized approach to financial
regulation. As the main actors in this undertaking, each ESA has been
equipped with certain regulatory tools, of which the ESA Guidelines are
the most extraordinary. Their soft-law character resembles global
coordination tools like those of the Basel Committee. However, even
though the Basel Committee and the ESAs share certain
characteristics, the deep legal embedding of the ESAs in European and
national law gives its soft-law instruments their distinctive character.
As an integral part of the European regulatory process, the
enforcement-coordinating ESA Guidelines are not only likely to be
strictly followed by Member State authorities, but will also turn into
hard-law requirements via their enforcement powers. While
underenforcement does not seem to be an issue, the ESA Guidelines'
soft-law nature leads to two different problems. First, soft law does not
need a legislative mandate and can be issued so long as it retains a
certain connection to the underlying hard law. Second, soft law is not
subject to the sophisticated legislative procedures that are supposed to
206. See generally Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SC. 165 (1984) (providing
an introduction to the concept of agency control via "policing" and "fire alarms").
207. ESA Regulations, supra note 5, at art. 43 5.
208. ESA Regulations, supra note 3, at art. 62. The budget is part of the general budget
of the Union, subject to a vote by Parliament and Council. TFEU art. 314.
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prevent undue influence and establish a regulatory compromise. This
leads to a setting in which ESA Guidelines can be issued on crucial
subjects without proper safeguards against preponderant industry
influence. However, the European legislature had to resort to a soft-law
instrument because of restrictive European law. In the specific setting
of the Lamfalussy procedure, this lead not only to a flexible and efficient
design but also to a two-level mechanism, by which Guidelines in
combination with their underlying principles seem to combine the
benefits of rules-based and principles-based regulatory techniques.
This leaves us with a number of problems de lege lata. The
compliance mechanism at the European level might prove too effective,
hardening the soft ESA Guidelines to an extent that annihilates the
benefits of its mixed character. Furthermore, the lack of judicial
accountability at the European level seems to run contrary to the wide-
ranging effects and the harmonizing goal of the Guidelines. Finally, a
preponderant industry interest might reduce the overall legitimacy of
the Guidelines. All of these deficiencies gain in importance from a
subjectivity perspective. However, most of them could be solved by
rather limited adjustments to the respective European administrative
law.
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